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Ghapter I
United States Intervention and International Law
It is the purpose of this thesis to point out the
relationship betv/een American military and diplomatic in-
tervention and international law, and to come to some con-
clusion either justifying or condemning the United States
policy of intervention in this hemisphere, more especially
with reference to Mexico, during the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. It is to be noted that the United States
policy of intervention has been based partially upon the
Monroe Doctrine, and partially upon the right to intervene
to protect American lives and property. The international
community of nations has recognized the Monroe Doctrine as
being a special policy of the United States government in
this hemisphere, and has also sanctioned the ri^t of any
nation to land forces in that country v/hich is unable to
protect foreign citizens and interests.
The United States government, in interpreting the
Monroe Doctrine in its relation to intervention, has em-
phatically stated that "no European pov/er or combination
of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American
state of the right and power of self government, and of
shaping for itself its own political fortunes and desti-
nies •"''* Upon this interpretation has the United States
1. Latan^ - A History of the American Foreign Policy
,
Page 482.
c
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on several occasions justified its right to intervene in
the Caribbean.
Yet between 1850 and 1894, Great Britain had repeat-
edly tried to extend the western boundary of British Guiana
into Venezuelan territory. Venezuela, unable to settle the
question of Britain's right to seize this land, invoked,
through the usual diplomatic channels, the aid of the United
States. The American government responded by threatening
to declare war against Great Britain unless she arbitrated
the botmdary dispute. The British government, then occupied
v;ith African difficulties as v/ell, agreed to permit the
American commissioners to investigate the question in dis-
pute. Great Britain had tried to strangle the rights of a
smaller state in this hemisphere, and the United States,
under the Monroe Doctrine, intervened to prevent it.
Stov/ell, the well-kno'.vn authority on international
law, has justified the intervention of the United States in
Cuba and Panama for humanitarian reasons, "intervention on
the ground of humanity is justifiable as a matter of prece-
dent, as v/ell as theory.""'** At times it has been most dif-
ficult to decide whether the United States has intervened
in a Caribbean country for the good of the people or for
the protection of interests already acquired. The author
is inclined to believe that previous to 1910, the evidence
shows that we did not pursue an entirely imperialistic
1. Stowell - Intervention in International Law
,
Pages 57
to 58.
c
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policy. v/hatever may have been the criticism of this pol-
icy, we as a nation have not been entirely able to over-
look our duties in the Caribbean. Smaller nations, unable
^ to quell disorders, must necessarily expect that the United
States will intervene for the political, economic and so-
cial betterment of the nation concerned.
For humanitarian reasons, the United States inter-
vened in Cuba in 1898. Not until conditions became unbear-
able, not until the island of Cuba became an international
nuisance, v/as it necessary for the American government to
compel Spain to relinquish her sovereignty/- over Cuba. On
several different occasions betv/een 1823 and 1896, we noti-
fied Spain that just so long as she governed her colony in
such a manner that Spanish rule was inoffensive to us, just
so long Y/ere we ready to defend the sovereignty of Spain
over the island.^*
During this period of continued unrest and exploita-
tion of Cuba by the mother country, repeated efforts were
2
made to get the Spanish government to institute reforms. *
Queen Maria promised to govern Cuba in a more humane manner,
but her few grants of self government had no noticeable ef-
fect upon political, social and economic conditions within
the colony.
Finally, in December, 1898, President LIcKinley
1. Columbia University - Martin, G. E. - Studies in Histor y,
Economic 'and Public Law , Vol. XCIII, Pages 139,140, 141."
2. United States Foreign Relations, 1898, Page 565.
3. Callahan - Cuba and International Relations, Page 463.
r
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appeared before Congress and recommended intervention for
humanitarian reasons and for the protection of American
lives, property and commerce.-^*
Since the intervention of the United States in 1898,
conditions within Cuba have greatly improved, end as a re-
sult, Cuba is today a sovereign and prosperous state. In
a little over three years of American occupation, a repub-
lic v/as modeled closely upon the lines of the United States.
At the conclusion of the period of intervention, the Piatt
Amendment was signed between the two governments.'^* Since
1902, the United States has had occasion, justified by the
Piatt Amendment, to intervene at four different times,
1904, 1906, 1912, 1917 — and each period of occupation was
entered upon with the one idea of restabilizing conditions
within the island, thus making her better able to fulfill
her international obligations. There has been criticism of
the Piatt Amendment in that it restricts the sovereignty of
Cuba. It is the opinion of American statesmen that the
treaty between Cuba and the United States gives us the
right to intervene only when the independence of the repub-
lic is endangered and a state of anarchy exists within her
borders
.
Based upon the right of intervention for the sake of
humanity and the advancement of commerce, the United States
took a hand in Panama. On these grounds, Stov/ell claims
1. United States Foreign Relations
, 1898, Page 757.
2. International Year Book, 1901, Page 229.
r
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that the United States had the right to recognize Panama
and to suppress the Panama-Colombia revolt. To be sure,
the latter had sovereignty over the former, but sovereign-
ty does not permit a state to make an abuse of its rights.-^
In 1903, the United States government negotiated a
treaty with Colombia which provided for the acquisition of
a strip of land through Panama. For the title to this land
we agreed to pay $10,000,000.00 outright, and an annuity of
ji^250,000.00. Since this land was needed to shorten the
trade route between the East and the '<Vest, it was essential
that we should acquire it in order that the whole world
might benefit by the constructian of a canal from the Pacif
ic to the Caribbean. V/hen the Colombian Senate refused to
ratify the treaty, our government allowed Panama to carry
on a successful revolution, and afterwards granting almost
immediate recognition to Panama, v/e negotiated a treaty for
the desired strip of land,
Within fifty-three years there were fifty-three rev-
olutions in Panama. The cause for dissatisfaction among
the people may be traced to the corruptness of the Colombi-
an government itself. It had become impossible for the peo
pie of Panama to tolerate any longer the despotism of cer-
tain dictators v/ho disregarded the wishes of the native pop
ulation. Previous to 1903, the American policy had been to
intervene to quell revolts in that property interests.
1. Stowell - Intervention and International Law
,
Pages
287, 288.
f
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naraely, railvmy investments, were endangered, but in 1903,
President Roosevelt allowed the revolution in Panama to
continue. Later, in justification of his policy, he made
this statement: "l did not lift my finger to incite the
revolutionists. I simply ceased to stamp out the different
revolutionary fuses that were already burning."
The construction of the Panama Canal, then, was
based upon this right to intervene for the sake of humanity.
It is well known that Colombia had reasons to delay the
treaty negotiation for the sale of land in the hope of ob-
taining a better price. There can be no denial that the
revolution in Panama was engineered by the United States
government; but Roosevelt's "politeness" did much for human-
ity at large by obviating the need of going around Gape Horn.
The twentieth century has witnessed a clearer concep-
tion of intervention. This newer interpretation made its
appearance in Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua and Mexico
under the phraseology of what some cautious statesmen term
the "big brother" policy of the United States. President
Roosevelt in 1904 most clearly defined the policy when he
stated: "Brutal wrong doing or impotence, which results in
the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may
finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and
in the Western Hemisphere, the United States cannot ignore
its duty,"^" But let us not forget that the term,
1. Theodore Roosevelt - Autobiography - Page 567.
2. Nation - "A Treaty with Chaos '; Vol.82, Page 4.
f
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" intervention" , in so far as the United States Government
is concerned, meant nothing more than the protection of
American investments in this hemisphere. Our new imperial-
istic policy was to be carefully classified as "dollar di-
plomacy."
American intervention in Santo Domingo from 1B98 to
1908 was in the first place, justified by Oppenheim*s defi-
nition of intervention, "if a state in war or peace does
not live up to the principles of the lav/s of nations which
we recognize, other states have the right to intervene, and
to see that states submit to obligatory demands ."
In the second place, the application of the Monroe
Doctrine justified our interference. Our country was forced
to intervene because French, Belgian and English creditors
brou^t pressure to bear upon their own governments to
threaten intervention in Santo Domingo.^* From European
history we know that, had these countries intervened, Santo
Domingo would never have enjoyed the independence which she
now has.
The occasion for intervention in Santo Domingo arose
from the fact that the government had borrowed so much money
from Belgium, Great Britain, the United States and France
that it was unable to pay the interest on these loans. Rec-
ognizing the fact that it could not meet these financial
1. Oppenheim - International Law , Vol. I, Pages 185 to 184
2. United States Foreign Relations
, 1905, Page 537.
i
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obligations, in 1888 the Dominican government allowed Wes-
tendrop & Company of Holland to collect customs receipts,
and what money was left after government expenses were paid
was to be used for the payment of outstanding foreign obli-
gations.
In 1890 when the Santo Domingo Improvement Company
of New York bought out the Dutch interests in Santo Domingo,
the Dominican government allowed the New York company to
discharge its debts by the same method which had been used
by the Westendrop Company of Holland. Shortly after this
transfer of ownership in 1895, the French demanded payment
on bonds due them, and to force the Dominican government to
meet its legal obligations, sent over a portion of the
French fleet The Santo Domingo Improvement Company suc-
ceeded in meeting the French demands, and in order to pre-
vent the possibility of a similar act on the part of other
foreign nations, called in nearly all of the outstanding
bonds which had been issued, so that few remained in circu-
lation outside of Belgian, Dutch, English and French mar-
kets .
Conditions in this Caribbean island became more
critical in 1899 when President Heureau was killed and the
Jimlnez faction seized the government. Revolutions became
so numerous that the United States government stationed the
cruiser "New Orleans" and the gunboat "ivlachias" in the
1. The United States Foreign Relations
, 1905, Page 345
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harbor of Santo Domingo City in order to protect the prop-
erty of the Santo Dorningo Improvement Company of New Yoric.
The climax of the Dominican situation was reached
in 1901 when President Jiminez v;ithdrew all rights and priv-
ileges which had previously been granted to the Santo Domin-
go Improvement Company. After the overthrow of Jiminez in
1902, the Dominican government offered to purchase the New
York company's rights of ownership. It was agreed that such
a purchase should be consummated only with the understanding
that full possession of the property should not be surren-
dered until conditions within Santo Domingo were sufficient-
ly stabilized to guarantee payments.
As no satisfactory agreement could be reached, and
since no degree of safety was insured to the Santo Domingo
Improvement Company's property, a detachment of twenty-nine
marines landed on Dominican soil at the request of American
property owners. After conditions became more satisfactory,
these marines v/ere withdrawn.
Again in January, 1904, two opposing factions headed
by Jiminez on the one hand and Morales on the other, strug-
gled for power, end a second time our government landed
marines at Puerto Plata to protect American lives and prop-
erty. Since we were on Dominican soil merely to protect
our own interests, and had Intervened without giving aid
p
to either psrty, intervention was justified. *
1. Report of the Secretary of the Navy
,
May, 1903, Page
1229.
2 . Right to Protect American Citizens by Landing Forces
in Foreign Countries
,
Page 32,
I
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President Morales, in desperation, requested the
aid of the American government to remedy the situation.
President Roosevelt thereupon signed a protocol on Janu-
ary 21, 1905 v/ith the Morales government which, in brief,
gave us the right to undertake the adjustment of all for-
eign as well as domestic obligations . 1* This document
was not ratified by the United States Senate until 1907.
This treaty became the basis of American intervention af-
ter 1907.
American intervention in Santo Domingo during the
period from 1916 to 1923 cannot be justified. To be sure,
our treaty of 1907 with the Dominican government states
that that government should not contract new loans with-
out the previous consent of the United States, * yet did
this clause in the treaty imply the power of interven-
tion? International law does not recognize the right to
intervene in case a treaty is violated unless a clause
within that document specifically so states.
Senator Borah voiced the opinion of many an Amer-
ican citizen v/hen he said that he believed it was the se-
rious intent of our government to seize Santo Domingo. He
pointed out that American property was as safe in Santo
Domingo as thouish it were in New York, and even though the
treaty of 1907 denied the right of any alien to acquire
property in Santo Domingo, nevertheless it did not prevent
1. United States Foreign Relations
, 1905, Page 511.
2. United States Foreign Relations
, 1907, Page 308
3. Stowell - Intervention in International Law
,
Page 447
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our government from seizing 20,000 acres of choice lands. '
Public criticism led to a Senate investigation, and
eventually. Secretary of State Hughes announced that after
adequate supervision of elections, marines would be v/ith-
drawn from Santo Domingo. This actually took place in Ju-
ly, 1925.
If intervention in Santo Domingo, under the pre-
text of protecting American interests, v/as unjustified by
international law, certainly that in Haiti, its neighbor,
has been. Of all the countries in the Caribbean afflict-
ed with disturbances, certainly Haiti has been the "hot-
bed" of revolutions. Until 1914, in its one hundred ten
years of independence, Haiti has had one king, two emper-
ors and tv/enty-seven presidents. Native ignorance and
the bloodthirstiness of its people have been two of the
underlying reasons for these revolutions. It was not
with the purpose of restoring law and order entirely that
we intervened in Haita, nor was it necessarily for pro-
tecting American lives and property. One of the vital
reasons for landing marines in 1914 and 1915 was the fear
of German control of the island.
Previous to 1914 the United States had sent battle-
ships to the republic at twenty-two different times in or-
der to protect American lives and property, and also to
restore law and order. During these years, the troubles
1. New York Times
,
May 22, 1922, Page 1.
1
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Rnd disturbances in Haiti were of such a serious nature
that the Secretary of the Navy felt called upon to com-
ment, in his reports, upon the fact that warships had
been sent there.
Conditions within Ke.iti became even more serious
in 1902 when the inhabitants of that island complained of
fraudulent elections, disqualification of legal voters,
and voiced their objection to the policy of President
Leconte in signing a commercial treaty with Germany rath-
er than with France.^* The Haitians naturally favored
the latter in that Prance had once occupied the island
under the regime of Napoleon I. This fact alone gave us
definite assurance that German aggression in Haiti v;'as
becoming serious. Vifhen the Panama Canal was completed,
and war broke out in Europe, German designs became even
more apparent.
As revolutions became more frequent, in 1914,
President V/ilson landed marines at Port au Prince. Brit-
ish, French and German marines v/ere likewise sent to Hai-
ti to quell disorders.^* At this particular time, Wilson
issued a memorandum stating that the government of the
United States desired nothing for itself from Haiti which
was not accorded to the citizens of other countries, "it
desires only to prove its sincere and disinterested
1. Senate Hearings on Haiti and Santo lomingo
, 1921,
Part I, Page 62.
2. United States Foreign Relations
, 1902, Pages 589-591.
3. United States Foreign Affairs
.
1914, Page 355.
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friendship for the republic and its people, and to ful-
fill its responsibilities as the friend to whom in such
crises, as the present, all the world looks to guide Hai-
ti out of its difficulties." Finally, President Wilson
pleaded for the disarming of the people and supervision
of elections by the United States government. Only after
a constitutional government had been set up in Haiti
could the government of the United States maintain its
international obligations
*
Proposal after proposal was made to the Haitian
crovernment in 1914 and 1915, but to these suggestions of
unselfish aid, a deaf ear was turned. Therefore, on Ju-
ly 28, 1915, Rear Admiral Caperton arrived with marines
at Port au Prince. Again the people of Haiti were assured
that v/e should retain our troops in their country only un-
2til a stable government had been established. '
With this purpose in mind, American marines have
been retained in Haiti. There has been no desire to an-
nex the island and intervention has not been for that
purpose. To be sure. President Cleveland thought such an
acquisition necessary because of its geographical posi-
tion, '^^ but in 1904 and again in 1915, Haiti was definite-
ly assured that the United States "had no designs on the
political and territorial integrity of Haiti.
1. United States Foreign Relations
, 1914, Page 357.
2. Senate Hearings
,
1921, Part I, Page 64, and 65.
3. North American Review
,
1912, Vol. 195,
"
A Caribbean
Derelict"-^'.'. P. Livings tone
ii
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In the establishment of law and order within Haiti
during the year 1914, the American government was sup-
ported by the collective intervention of France, Germany,
and England at Port au Prince, During the war, continued
retention of marines in Haiti by the United States gov-
ernment was based upon the fear of German acquisition,
Next to Cuba, Haiti was recognized as the most important
strategical point to the entrance of the Caribbean, the
Gulf of Mexico, and the Panama Canal. The island of Hai-
ti had especial attraction in that it had more wealth
than any other island of its size, V/e have definite evi-
dence that many Germans owned valuable property in the
republic, and had married into the best families. Had
not America intervened in 1914, there is a possibility
that Haiti would have been the base for German operations
in this hemisphere."^*
Furthermore, when in 1914 the Haitian government
was desperately in need of funds, Germany offered to un-
derwrite a loan of ,000.000 .00 in return for the con-
trol of certain ports and customs receipts, including the
right of a coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas. The re-
port of this offer v/as denied by Germany but the "Wall
Street Journal'* did not regard this as a real denial, but
as a hint that unless the United States took action at
once, Germany would. ^'
1. Senate Hearings
,
Part IV, Page 1500.
2. Literary Digest
,
1914, Vol. 49 - '^German Intentions in
Haiti" - Page 1303.
ii
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No doubt the one harsh criticism of American inter-
vention in Haiti should be made in connection with the
treaty of September 16, 1915, which the Haitian government
was forced to sign. In brief, this treaty gave to the
United States for ten years economic, political and so-
cial domination: in reality, the treaty signed away the
sovereignty of Haiti.
No doubt our policy in Haiti is open to adverse
criticism. The Haitians recognize that they are irres-
ponsible and ignorant, but what they demand is that we
"make good" in our control of the republic. Foreign na-
tions have admitted that our forces must remain in Haiti
until present conditions are bettered. Despite the reports
which sometimes fill our nev/spapers, conditions are stead-
ily improving. It must be remembered that ninety to nine-
ty-five per cent, of the Haitian population is ignorant
and illiterate, and that as a nation, as a "big brother",
as the originator of the Monroe Doctrine, our duty in
Haiti is to stabilize conditions politically, socially
and economically, and then get out. Our actions, not our
words, are judged.
The most recent case of United States intervention
in this hemisphere is that in Nicaragua. The author, in
spite of what the Department of State has tried to make
the public believe, considers that intervention vjas under-
taken for the purpose of protecting our land concession
1. Senate Hearings
,
1921, Part I, Page 66.
I{
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\7hich was obtained by the Rryen-Ghsrrnorro Treaty of Aug-
ust, 1914. It is a well known fact that nob only do cer-
tain elements among the liberal class oppose this treaty,
but thfit the Central American Court of Justice, an organi
zation sponsored by the United States government, handed
down a decision declaring the treaty invalid. Nicaragua,
backed by our military and naval pov/er, and with three
millions of dollars at her feet, in payment for the land
concession, refused to abide by the decision of the
court, -^^
Previous to 1912, Nicaraguan finances v/ere con-
trolled by a snail group of Ajnerican speculative brokers.
Since our occupation in 1912, loans have been supervised
by the State Department of the United States.^'
Not only have loans been supervised by the Depart-
ment of State for the purpose of aiding that president or
party most favorable to the American government, but in
October, 1928, the United States supervised the Nicaragua
elections. This was undertaken to guarantee to the inhab
itants of that country free f^nd fair elections on the one
hand, and on the other, to see to it that no man who did
not favor the Bryan-Gharmorro Treaty should become presi-
dent.
From past experience v/e have discovered that only
1 . Annals of the American Academy - "The Rights of Small
American Nations" (Nicaragua and Colombia) Muzzy, R . H
Vol. 72, Page 173.
2 • Annals of the American Academy - "The United States
and Nicaragua^^- Dodds, H. "J, - Vol. 132, Page"l41.
ii
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v/hen peace and security are insured, is it possible for
certain Caribbean countries to carry out their interna-
tional obligations so that conditions v/ill be favorable
for foreign investments. V'/hen revolutions have been in-
cited by a sraall group which has been exploited by a
stronger and wealthier nation, then intervention has been
the course to be pursued by our government in order to
protect American interests, ^'/hether it has been for self-
ish or unselfish reasons, we must remember that it is only
natural that our government should protect its nationals
v/herever they may be. That our policy in the Caribbean
has at times been too despotic, we cannot deny. A middle
course must be adopted, a course described with full
force and meaning to the words, "all nations, both weak
and powerful, shall control their ov/n internal affairs, "l.
1. 'Vilson as I Knov/ Him—Tumulty - Page 145

-18-
Chapter II.
The First Period of United States Intervention
in Mexico. 1825-1867
It will be noted that Spanish misgovernment of
Mexico from 1513 to 1813 was responsible for so much
political and social disorder in Mexico during the
period 1825-1867. Shortly after the Mexican Decla-
ration of Independence in 1813, French and English
financiers, desirous of obtaining valuable land con-
cessions in Mexico, stirred up a hatred against the
United States which resulted in the Texan War of 1847-
1848. Evidence shows that the United States govern-
ment attempted to avert this war, and under the Polk
administration pursued a policy of conciliation in an
effort to adjust differences of opinion over the
Authentic material on Mexican-United States re-
lations between 1825-1867 is rather limited.
Bancroft's, Smith's, Priestly's, Ripey's, and
Rives* Trorks are the most valuable sources for
this period.
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ownership of Texas. Betv;een 1864-1867 the American
Government again showed its unselfish interest in
Mexico by maintaining a strict neutrality and by
lending its diplomatic aid in an attempt to prevent
France from continuing to dominate, illegally, the
Mexican state.
To understand the causes for the Mexicaji
situation between 1825-1867, a brief history of that
Latin-American country is essential. Located as
it is with its boiandaries of two oceans, Mexico
has offered a unique spot for the exertion of foreign
influence. Revolt, ch^aract eristic of Mexico, has
played an important role in her development. In
spite of her apparent backwardness in the past, Mexico
has possibilities, - possibilities which, if there
were a stable government and an educated people, could
be so developed as to create a country of prestige
and one free from foreign interference. As Trowbridge
has well asserted - "The lights are always strong, the
shadows always dark."^*
1. Trowbridge, Mexico Today sind Tomorrow
,
Page 1
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The earliest Mexican inhabitants are thought to
have come from the far North, Migrating south into v/hat
Is now California and Mexico, they separated and formed
two important tribes, the Toltecs and Aztecs. These two
civilizations developed educational, military, govern-
mental and religious institutions of an exceptionally
high standard,"^*
When the Spaniards arrived in Mexico in the six-
teenth century, the Aztecs, ruled by Montezuma III, formed
the most powerful of the Indian tribes. Cortez, landing
in 1519 at what is now the City of Vera Cruz, marched in-
land, and in May 1521, had mexico City under the control
of Spain. By 1535 the Spanish forces had conquered the
whole of the present state of Mexico, and now began, to
1813, the exploitation of the natives of the Hew V/orld,
an exploitation which was to show its disastrous effects
upon the political, social, and economic life of its peo-
ples after the Mexican Declaration of Independence in
1813,
The Spanish government did not intend that anyone
except those bom in Spain, the Gachupines, should rule
her colonies. To the Gachupines were given all the im-
portant political, social and religious offices. Al-
though the Creole, bom of Spanish parents in the New
1. Bancroft, H.H, Native Races . Vol, II, Pages 91-293.
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V^orld, had as much ability and intelligence as his fellcM
countrymen, all social and many political aspirations were
denied him. The American-born Spaniard, therefore, de-
veloped a feeling of hatred toward his government, and,
when the time presented itself, was ready to shake off the
yoke of Spain,
Then, too, there were the half-breeds, or the
Mestizo group, v/ho were held even more in bondage than
the Creoles. To them were left the duties of servants.
The Mestizo class was denied the right of owning land,
of exploiting the mines, developing commerce, and holding
positions of responsibility in the church or state. Such
an attitude on the part of the Spanish government natur-
ally continued the state of illiteracy among the lower
classes of Spanish subjects. Indeed, there developed
logically among these people jealousy and class hatred
which have lasted even until today. It is still evident
in the tv;entieth century that the lower classes of Mexi-
caiB possess the same undeveloped intellect v^hich was
theirs in the seventeenth century,
Not only wore the Creoles and Mestizos exploited
to the advantage of the Spaniard, but the native Indian
became the ward and the serf to the haciendado. It v/as
very seldom that he was able to own land, and that which
he did own was heavily taxed. To be sure, many of the
1. Priestly: The Mexican Nation
.
Page 119.
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Indlans were segregated in towns to be taught the Catholic
religion, and how to make a better living. But such a
system failed to bring about literacy, in that the Indian
was incapable of such advancement; and, since they were
segregated in towns, dissension was bound to develop, thus
1.
bringing about a decay of the missionary enterprises.
Spain, therefore, introduced into the New V/orld an
advanced European civilization which failed to take root
and create harmony among all classes of people. The Span-
ish sought conquest and domination for thair own personal
economic gain without taking the natives into their organ-
ization. This unfortunate system sowed its seeds, and, no
doubt, has been responsible for the creation of unstable
conditions within Mexico during the 19th and 20th centuries.
It was not entirely years of Spanish misgovernment
which led Mexico to revolt, Philip the Second's loss of
power throughout Europe, and the defeat of the Spanish
Armada were remote incentives. i>.dded to these were the
American and French Revolutionary influences. Napoleon's
occupation of Spain in 1812, and the Revolution of 1820 in
Spain. The Creole classes, sensing this weakening of
Spanish power, and taking advantage of the fact that troubles
at home were such that interest in New Spain had for the
moment waned, first undertook to form secret revolutionary
societies to undermine Spanish power.
1. Priestly: The Mexican Nation
.
Page 123.
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Along with the social and political inequality was
the fact that, during the Spanish re's ime , and indeed until
today. Justice had been for the few. It is a well known
fact that previous to 1844 there had been no codification
of Mexican law. In 1845 the head of the Judicial Depart-
ment accused Congress of reducing the dignity and in-
fluence of the judges and magistrates. As far back as
1834, one of jingland*s diplomats stated that the greatest
evil in Mexico of which foreigners had to complain was
"the corrupt and perverse administration of justice.""^*
Why did not Congress change the laws, and why did the po-
lice of certain districts within Aiexico give protection
to the bandits? The answer to these questions can be
found in the fear that the bandit would take revenge upon
the officials of justice, once that criminal was released;
secondly, that while justice was improperly administered,
the greater chance was there of lining pockets with Mexi-
can treasury receipts; and lastly, that public opinion was
not educated to the point of criticism. Spain had re-
quired her subjects to think as little as possible, keep
still and obey orders. The Native population was taught,
with a whip at the church door, if necessary, "to fear
2.
God, priest and magistrate,"
1. Smith: The '/Ter with Mexico . Vol. I, P£.ge 13.
2. Ibid. Page 14.
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Brlefly summarized, what did Mexico gain from Spanish
rule previous to her declaration of independence in 1815?
It cannot be denied that Spain governed Mexico efficiently.
But did this efficiency include training all classes of
people for later political responsibilities? Did not Spain
overestimate her potential abilities? Did she not attempt
to rule 19th century Mexico with 16th century methods?
From a studj'' of political, social and economic conditions
within Nevr Spain between 1521 and 1813, we can readily
supply the answer. Spain had firmly established a govern-
ment possessing the sole initiative; had produced friction
within resulting from privilege and monopoly, and in gen-
eral, had founded an ignorant and inert civilization know-
only **hard oppression, blind obedience, passionate feuds and
gross pleasures."^*
In 1810 separation was planned, but as the fact was
disclosed to Spanish officials, the impromptu revolution
collapsed. Some months later Hidalgo, a former parish
priest who had been much influenced by French revolution-
ary propaganda, led a large bend of followers in a suc-
cessful battle against the Spanish troops. Hidalgo's
success was not of long duration for in 1811 he was de-
feated and shot as a traitor. The result of this revolt
was little but a record of horrors and a memory of whole-
sale murder. His successor, Morelos, captured most of
the Mexican territory under Spanish rule, and in 1813
1. Smith: The War with Mexico , Vol. I.
,
Page 30.
4
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1.
declared the independence of Mexico. Following the exe-
cution of Morelos, Iturbide, first a royalist and then a
separatist, was able to defeat the Spanish forces, and,
after a series of struggles, seize Mexico City in 1820,
After Iturbide assumed the role of a dictator, the people
became dissatisfied with his despotic rule and extrava-
gance, and in 1823 compelled him to resign.
Thus in 1825 began an era of revolutions, and not
until one hundred years later was Mexico able to settle
down to the business of "setting her house in order,".
During the 19th and 20th centuries there were so many
personal and factional quarrels, that each struggle left
the Mexican treasiiry in a state of bankruptcy. Each new
government repudiated the debts of the preceding one un-
til Mexico found herself confronted with foreign inter-
vention for the forcible collection of these loans.
Since the Mexican government needed money, its valuable
oil lands were sold, and that oil company which gave the
greatest financial support to the government obtained the
most valuable concession. Naturally this type of govern-
ment benefited a few, and the lower classes found them-
selves living under exactly the same conditions that they
had endured under Spanish rule. Mexican history, then,
from 1825 on, centers about this struggle for equality,
but being untrained in political, social and economic
1, Priestly: The Mexican Nation, Page 252.
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fields of endeavor, and at no time until 1923 able to re-
sist the dollar diplomacy of stranger nations, i>^iexico
seethed in revolution.
Let us pause for a moment to discover just what at-
titude certain European nations took tov/ard this new
Latin-American nation. The first Mexican constitution
was promulgated in 1825."^* It v/as based upon the United
States document, but backed by a full treasury of i^nglish
2.
gold. lie shall see the significance of the latter re-
nark as we briefly trace Mexican political and economic
history between the years 1325 and 1346. This period be-
tween 1825 and 1846 witnessed continual strife betv/een
those supporting a Federal type of government, and those
sponsoring e central form of government. Suffice it to
say that the struggle took place between Santa ^^.nna, a
popular hero, now posing as a Centralist, no?/ as a Feder-
alist, according to which side offered him the more sup-
port, and Guerro Pedraza, Zovela Sustamente, and Florias.
The aristocrats, for the first time in Mexican history,
refused to participate in politics. It became more
fashionable to acquire estates (haciendas) than to mingle
in politics. Furthermore, this particular era of Mexican
history is to be described as that of the "survival of the
fittest," and thn exploitation of the populace by
1. Robertson: "Lat lii-iimerican Nations ." Page 479.
2. Smith: The V/ar with Mexico
.
Vol. I, Page 37.
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those who haDpened to be powerful enough to seize the key
1.
to Mexico City, Vera Cruz.
The year 1837 proved to be the beginning of Mexican
revolutionary history. The crisis developed over an empty
treasury, and the ^resignation of the Mexican cabinet.
Santa Anna, seizing his opportunity to popularize himself,
stepped to the forefront, offered his services to a bewil-
dered people, and then to the astonishment of the more con-
servative political groups, declared himself dictator.
As supreme ruler, Santa Anna suspended all laws at his
pleasure, and adopted new ones; he convoked and dissolved
Congress at will; he juggled the tariff; the church was
made subservient to him, and, in general, there was "no
law but his own will." Finally, in January, 1845, the
people no longer trusted him, and as a consequence, he
fled from Mexico City and in later years was banished.
Smith very well characterizes this popular idol of the
masses as being a charlatan; though head of the army, he
knew no military science; though head of the nation, he
was not a statesman. "By right of superiority, and by
2.
right of conquest, Mexico was his," It Is well to keep
this characterization in mind in that it best describes
those leaders who from this period on dominated Mexico.
The United States government sent its first minister
1. Rives, G.L. U. S. and Mexico
, Vol. I, Chap. VII.
2. Smith: The .Var with Mexico
,
Vol. I, Page 54.
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to Mexico in 1825. Immediately, problems arose which
were caused by the sending of a protestant to a Catholic
country: by the aristocrats who v/anted a king; by the en-
forcement of the Monroe Doctrine; and lastly, by combat-
ing the enormous political and financial influence which
Great Britain exerted over Mexico,
The first diplomatic question of any seriousness,
in which the United vStates became involved, was over the
disputed boundary line between Mexico and the United
States. By the treaty of 1819 with Spain the American
government agreed to relinquish all rights to Texan terri-
1.
tory west of the Sabine River. Our minister to Mexico
attemcted, in 1825, to get the Mexican authorities to rati-
fy this treaty. As Obregon, then President of Mexico,
was not ready to act upon the treaty, the boundary question
remained unsettled. Imm.ediately the Mexicans accused us
of stalling in order to seize Texas. For the first time
Americans were under suspicion, this attitude of mind be-
ing one reason for the misunderstanding which so rapidly
developed between the two neighbors during the 19th cen-
2.
tury.
The Texan situation cane to a climax in 18S5 when
the inhabitants of Texas severed relationship with Mexico.
Just what were the reasons for this separatist movement?
1. Priestly: The Mexican Nation, Page 277.
2. Smith: The Mexican '.Var, Vol. I, Pages 60 and 61.

In 1821 Moses Austin went to Mexico and obtained from
1.
President Itiirbide the right to colonize Texas. The Texan
colony and the Mexican government were on friendly terms
until 1850 when the latter passed a law prohibiting slavery
as well as making provisions for Mexican colonization in
Texas, In 1854 the Mexican government took drastic steps
to prevent the development of self-government in Texas by
dissolving state and national congresses. Immediately
independence was sought, but although Santa Anna was com-
pelled, through defeat, to sign a treaty granting inde-
pendence, the Mexican government never recognized the vali-
dity of it. Naturally the Mexican government accused the
United States of encouraging the Texan revolt, but Smith
produces definite evidence to show that when the British
minister told Santa Anna that the United States had done
all it could to nrevent the rupture, the Mexican govern-
2.
ment agreed.
During the year 1856 the boundary dispute became
even more acute when the Mexican government refused to live
up to its part of the treaty of 1851 by which the two na-
tions agreed to cooperate in quelling all Indian attacks
5.
on either side of the Sabine River. As a result of Indian
1. Rives, G.L. The U. S. and Mexico, 1821-1848, Vol.1,
Page 141.
2. Smith: The Mexican V/ar
. Vol. I, Page 65.
5. Moore, J.B. Digest of Internal Law, Vol.V, Page 778.
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attacka. United States forces were sent to the west bank
of the Sabine River, and, when Indian raids became more
serious, American soldiers pursued the Indians into Mexican
territory. Thus, for the first time. United States sol-
diers invaded Mexico. Much criticism of the American poli-
cy was expressed, but it was justified in that international
law recognizes the right of another nation, in the interests
of "self-preservation," to invade a neighboring state when
that state fails to administer its laws in such a way as to
prevent private persons from arming upon its soil for the
purpose of invading a neighboring state. ^"/hen a state
fails to prevent an invasion after due v/arning has been
given that it will not be tolerated, then the threatened
nation may mass its troops along the frontier, and even
1.
pursue the offenders into neighboring territory.
Immediately after the United States forces invaded
Mexico, the Mexican minister asked for his passports. The
following year, 1857, Texan independence was recognized by
the United States government.
Santa Anna, in 1842, rekindled Mexican-United States
enmity, and at his instigation, invasions into Texan terri-
tory occurred. As a result, many citizens of the United
States, fearing British action against the United States,
2.
migrated to the field of combat. The question may be
1. H. Taylor: International Public Law . Page 405.
2. Smith: The V7ar with Mexico . Vol. I, Page 67.

asked, as to v;hy and how England gave rioral support to
Mexico as against the United States? In the first nlace
England desired to retain a monopoly of her financial in-
terests in Mexico; and she feared that American financial
aggression and domination would become more pronounced if
we took Texas. Indeed, Lord Aberdeen expressed a desire
to see Mexico acknowledge the independence of Texas, be-
lieving that France would follow in recognizing Texas as
a nation and that such recognition would guarantee the
sovereigntv of Texas, as \vell as create a buffer state
1.
between the United States and Mexico,
How did England, in the second ulace, morally aid
and promote the struggle? English newspapers pointed
out that "the soldiers of the tri-color are superior to
those of the United States", "America as an aggressive
power is one of the weakest in the World, - fit for
nothing but to fight Indians,'-'
Spurred on by England's misleading statererts, and
by propaganda successfully spread by vairiglorious and am-
bitious rebels among an ignorant class of people, on the
one hand, who were made to feel the dangers of conquest
by the United States, and on the other hand, by the aris-
tocratic class who feared American democratic ideas, Santa
Anna, in June 1845, decreed that all foreigners caught
1, Smith: The Annexation of Texas , Page 589,
2, Smith: The Mexican ?far
. Page 105, 104,

bearing arms in Texas should be executed.
In reply to this mandate, t^e United States Secretary
of State Webster replied that, inasmuch as during the Amer-
ican Revolutionary War, German and French citizens when
captured were treated merely as prisoners of war, so should
1.
we expect Santa Anna to treat our citizens.
It can he plainly shown that during this critical
period, between 1842 and 1846, the United States government
did all within its pov/er to prevent the Mexican War. When
on May 12, 1842, the Mexican government protested against
aid which our citizens gave the Texans in the latter'
s
struggle for independence, 7/ebster replied emphatically
that our policy of neutrality would continue.
Again in 1843, the United States Secretary of State
attempted to obtain Texas through peaceful methods, and
offered an indemnity for its annexation.
Even after Mexico severed relations with the United
States, after the latter had annexed Texas in March 1845,
President Polk notified the Mexican government that our
policy would continue friendly, and that we should cooper-
ate to restore order. Again liberal terms were offered
4.
for the acquisition of Texas.
1. Smith: The Mexican War
. Page 70. (Vol. I)
2. Smith: The Mexican War
.
Vol, I, Page 68.
3, Ibid. Page 74.
4, Ibid. Page 88.
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Finally, in 1845, President Polk sent Slidell as
a special representative to Mexico in order thet he might
be in there to facilitate matters when circumstances
should warrant a peaceful adjustment of the boundary and
1.
annexation questions. Just at the moment when it appear-
ed that a treaty settling the difficulties might be signed.
President Herrera was acused of "seeking to avoid a neces-
sary and glorious war," and of stooping to negotiate "the
ignominous loss of national integrity" with an iimerican
2.
army. So eager had the Mexican liberals become for war,
thet nothing could be done to prevent it, European and
rebel propaganda had been most effective! Only a few
shots and the Mexican arm3'- would be victorious I "Here
stood an American minister," answered Slidell, "clothed
with full power to settle all the questions in dispute be-
tween two nations." "Begone," said Mexico, once more.
In December 1847, war was begun between the two com-
petitors for Texas, Mexico was clearly the aggressor
in that war. The leader of the Mexican forces, Crista,
made note of the fact in his statement, "I had the plea-
sure of being the first to begin the war." To be sure.
President Polk had already sent troops along the Rio
Grande border, but "the American forces did not advance
1, G, B, Stuart: Latin-America and United State s. Page 96.
2. Ibid . Page 99.
c
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to the Rio Grande until after war became inevitable, and
1.
then only as an army of observation."
Furthermore to xtdmiral Conner, corrjaanding in the
Gulf, the Secretary of the Havy wrote in March 1345, "The
disposition of the President is to maintain the most friend-
ly relations with the Mexican Republic." "Take special
care," the department said to Stockton, v;ho had a few ves-
sels on the Texas coast, "to avoid every act that can admit
of being construed as inconsistent with our friendly rela-
2.
tions,"
It is noticeable that the United States did all it
could to promote peace. It is not necessary to discuss
the merits of those arguments so often advanced that Amer-
icans brought about the war because they wanted Texas,
Sufficient evidence has been produced to refute the claim
that President Polk desired war to annex Texan territory.
In spite of the clamor in the South for war, in August
1845, Polk wrote confidentially to a Senator, "»7e will not
be the aggressors upon Mexico," •
Again, the government's act in annexing Texas in
1845 has often been unjustly criticized. '</ho brought about
the independence of Texas? Is not "self-determination"
1. Quoted by J. H. Smith, The Mexican War
.
Vol. I, Page 155.
2. Quoted by Smith, The Mexican <Var
.
Vol. I, Page 131.
3. Ibid . Page 131.
cc
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one of the recognized principles of international law?
Mexico, economically, socially and politically unstabilized
attempted, half-heartedly, to control Texas. Texan end
Mexican interests were not identical. In the one state
there was an intelligent people, desirous of pursuing peace
ful occupations; in the other, a large maiority of illi-
terate natives and leaders v/ere clamoring for excitement
and political control which could result in nothing but
a continued state of revolution. After nine years of
independence, self-government, and recognition by several
foreign states, was it not legitim.ate for Texans, dis-
satisfied with the administration of their own affairs,
to ask for annexation to the United States? It is the
opinion of the author that Mexico had no grounds for the
declaration of war against the United States in 1846, in
that the principle of "self-determination" had settled
the question of the legality of Texan independence. It
is to be recognized that the United States government did
all within its power to obtain Texas through neaceful
acquisition, and lastly, that having been invited hj the
inhabitants of that territory to annex it, we v/ere justi-
fied under international law in doing so.
The decade following the treaty of Guadalupe
1.
Hidalgo (1848) by which the United States acquired some
half million acres of territory, was m.arked by continued
1. Rives, C-.L. The U. S. and Mexico
,
1821-48, Vol. 11,
Chapter XLIX
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strife and turmoil in Mexico. Again, there ensued a
struggle between those desiring centralization on the one
hand, and those striving for a federal form of government,
1.
The new constitution of 1857 which was based upon that of
the United States, only brought about a renev/al of the
conflict, and this civil war in turn was an iramediete cause
of European intervention, smd the creation of the Maxamilian
Empire in Mexico,
Let us pause a moment to consider the reasons for
this period of civil strife between 1859 and 1860, and to
see why European nations, nam.ely Spain, Great Britain, and
France, were interested in this Latin-American country.
In the first place the constitution of 1857 was too con-
servative for a radical and rebellious people. There is
no doubt that, had the Mexicans accepted this document, and
helped to enforce its provisions, Mexican history would have
been less turbulent. But as has been pointed out before,
the lower classes of people did not, because of the lack
of education, understand the purposes of government. It
is always best to educate the Deople of a nation before
granting constitutional privileges. Then, too, Mexico
was a country of landless natives. Large estates had been
accumulated by the wealthy, and the mestizo and peon had
the choice of serfdom, or shifting for themselves. Many
of the lower classes, feeling the injustice of such a sys-
1. W. S. Robertson, Latin-American Nations. Page 488,
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tem, fled to the mountains and joined charlatans who led
these dissatisfied peoples in revolt. Lastly, the con-
stitution of 1857 deprived the Catholic church of its
former glory and prestige. One of the articles provided
that no ecclesiastical corporation should have the legal
capacity to acquire real estate, "except such buildings
as might be necessary for the service of the respective
corporation.""^* Furthermore, the constitution failed to
recognize Roaan Catholicism as the sole religion of
Mexico."^'
In the light of past and present Mexican history,
it is a recognized fact that the I^xican creole and peon
are very devout. '(Then he was deprived of his daily sus-
tenance, and his only hope, because religion in reality is
the spiritual food of the Mexican, revolt became frequent.
Even today, conditions are not dissimilar.
On the other hand, the constitution was too liberal
for the conservatives. It granted freedom of petition,
speech, and the press, and it prohibited confiscation of
property. Besides, it provided for civil, criminal and
military courts; and justice was to be fairly adminis-
tered. The result was a struggle between the liberals
and conservatives, in which the liberals were defeated,
and the constitution was withdrawn by the conservatives.
There now entered upon the scene of action another faction
1. V/. S. Robertson, Latin-American Nations
.
Page 483.
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which, on the one hand, opposed the anti-religious program
of the liberals led by Juarez, located at Vera Cruz, and
the conservative landed gentry which was in control of
Mexico City. This triangular struggle, known as the V/ar
of Reform, ended in 1860 when Juarez defeated the other
two factions, and this champion of the constitution and
1.
religious reform triumphantly entered I^lexico City,
Juarezes reforms were the undoing of Mexico. In the
first place, he ordered that diplomats from Spain, Guate-
mala, -i^cuador, and the Roman Catholic church be expelled
from Mexico because of aid which they had given to the
conservative class; secondly, his program called for the
expulsion of certain high church officials; and lastly,
he susnended payments on all foreign loans for a period
2.
of two years.
Because of Juarez's anti-religious program, Spain
in 1853, threatened to intervene. The United States Sec-
retary of State, Cass, announced that we would resist
such intervention^by all the means in our power,'* *
Likewise, Great Britain, in 18b9, made it known that she
was about to send a fleet to Vera Cruz to collect pay-
ment on loans due her. The United States government
1. H, I. Priestly, The Mexican Nation
.
Page 338,
2. L. Robertson: The Mexican Nation
.
Page 492.
3. Moore's Digest of International Law . Vol. VI, Page 477.

promptly replied that such intervention would be against
the policy of the United States,"^*
Again in 1860, Breat Britain, under the pretext of
debt collection, appealed to the United States to inter-
vene jointly with her and France in order to quell the
civil war in mexico. To this the American government re-
plied, "»7e are opposed to any interference, especially
with joint interference, of other powers in the domestic
2.
affairs of an independent nation."
Unable to obtain the consent of the United States
government to intervene, the three powers, Spain, France
and Great Britain, signed the Treaty of London on October
31, 1851, whereby the three nations were to occupy portions
of the Mexican coast in order to enforce payments on loans
due their respective citizens. The treaty stipulated,
however, that the autonomy and integrity of Mexico should
be respected. It is of interest to note that the French
claims, according to Juarez, amounted to the sum of
$2,860,762; the British, $69, 994, 542; and those of Spain
$9,460,986,
Just what attitude did the United States government
1, Moore's Digest of International Law , Vol. VI, Page 479.
2, Martin, C,i;,, Columbia University, Studies in History
.
-Economics and Public Law
.
Vol. XCIII, Page 40.
3, H, I, Priestly: The Mexican I^'ation
.
Page 342,
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take toward this new scheme of collecting debts? On
September 2, 1861, the United States government, at the
instigation of President Lincoln, offered to loan Juarez
sixty-two million pesos at six percent interest. Our
government in turn agreed to pay three percent interest
on the total amount of money due European governments,
covering a five year period. This loan was to be backed
by the public lands of the Mexice.n government.
Possibly President Juarez would have been willing to
borrow the money had not the church and privileged classes,
which desired intervention, refused to ratify the treaty.
The fact has already been mentioned that the constitution
of 1357, as enforced by Juarez, opposed the special privi-
leges of both of these classes of people. It is to be
noted that the clergy and landed gentry did not disfavor
the establishment of a monarchical form of government, since
this type of government would restore to thera rights which
they had enjoyed previous to 1857,
It is possibly just as well that the Mexicans did
not accept Lincoln's proposal in that the government at
Washington needed every cent which it could scrape up to
carry on the Civil Y/ar which was raging in the United
States at that time. As a result of the Civil War, the
United States did not take an active part in the prevention
of foreign intervention until 1365. It was our policy to
1, George Creel: The People Next Door
.
Page 224.
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allow Spain, France, and England to land troops on Mexican
soil, just as long as it was for the nuroose of collecting
1.
just debts, but selfish aims were not to be tolerated.
As early as 1861, before France intimated that her
policy in Mexico would be one of colonization, ^^ecretary of
State Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, our minister to France,
asking him to warn France that "V/e, (United States) have
more than once informed all parties to the alliance (the
Treaty of London) that we cannot look with indifference
upon any armed European interference for political ends
in a country situated so near and connected so closely as
2.
Mexico.
"
To this France replied that she considered she had
the right to intervene for the redress of Injuries, and
challenged the United States to m-ake objection. Sev;ard
then answered, "the United States recognizes the right of
France to make war against Mexico, and to determine for her-
5.
self the cause."
As a final warning to France, on June 21, 1861,
Seward sent the following message,- "Vi'e have the right to
insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to
raise up in Mexico an nnti-republic , or anti-American
4.
government, or to maintain such government ^s,"
1. Priestly: The Mexican Nation, Page 548.
2. Quoted by George Creel, The People Next Door , Page 249.
3. Ibid, Page 249. ^
4. Ibid, Page 249.
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In December 1861, France, Spain, and J^ngland landed
9,000 men at Vera Cruz, '^Yhen France proposed the estab-
lishment of a foreign government in I»Iexico, opain and -Eng-
land withdrew their forces. Napoleon III clearly desig-
nated his ambitions in Mexico when he said, "V/e shall have
restored to the Latin race upon the opposite side of the
ocean, its strength and prestige; we shall have guaranteed
the security to our colonies in the Antilles, and to those
of Spain; we shall have established our beneficent influ-
ence in the center of America, and this influence, by cre-
ating immense openings to our commerce, will procure for
us the matter (cotton) indispensable to our industry'-,''
Again on July 3, 1362, he informed the French
General, Forly, that France could not sit by and see the
United States "becom-e the sole master of the New j7orld,"
Napoleon's scheme of a '<Yorld Empire was well under
way when an Assembly of Notables met in Mexico City on
July 10, 1863. General Alm.onte, a Mexican aristocrat,
sponsored a treaty between France and Mexicq whereby the
Mexican nation adopted "a monarchical, temperate and here-
ditary form of government, under a Catholic Prince who
2.
shall have the title of -Emperor of Mexico,"
Immediately after the conclusion of this treaty,
1. iuoted by George Creel. The People Next Door
.
Page 225,
2, S. Schroeder; Fall of Maximilian's ^mnire - As Seen
from a United States Gun-Boat y Jrage 4»
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Foreign Minister, M, Drouyn de l*Huys, intimated to our
minister to France than an early ucknov/ledgement of the
proposed Empire by the United States would be most con-
venient to France in relieving the troublesome complica-
tions in Mexico, Secretary of State Seward told our
Minister to France to inform Napoleon that the United
States still considered the Mexican government not sub-
servient to a foreign pov/er, and as such we should still
retain a relationship of peace and sincere friendship
1.
toward the Mexican people and President Juarez,
Again on April 4, 1364, the United States House of
Representatives voted a resolution emphasizing that it
was not the **policy of the United States to acknowledge
any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any
republican government in America under the auspices of
any European power,*' *
In spite of the v/arning of the United States govern-
ment that the establishment of a monarchy in this hemi-
sphere would not be tolerated, and in spite of the well
known phraseology of the Monroe Doctrine as issued in 1825,
but not directly implied by Seward's warning to France in
1864, on June 12, 1864, a nephew of Napoleon III, Maximilian,
was established upon the throne of Mexico, Supported by
1, S. Schroeder: Fall of li'Iaxiuilian's -Cimpire - As Seen
form a United States Gun-Boat, Page 5<
2, luoted by iff, S. Robertson, Kisranio ^erican Relations
with the United States
.
Page 103.
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thirty thousand French soldiers, creating for Mexico a debt
of $56,000,000, and borrowing on his own account i^40,000,000
more fron London and Paris, Maximilian triumphantly entered
Mexico City as the puppet of the clerical party and landed
gentry.
No sooner had the Emperor been declared sovereign
ruler of Mexico, than Papal legates appeared in Mexico City
to request that the Catholic church be restored to its for-
mer glory and supremacy. Much to the surprise of those who
had supported Maximilian in the hope of witnessing the res-
toration of Papal power, the Emperor replied that both the
sovereign ruler and the Pope were 'febsolute in their re-
spective limits. Between the tv^o there can be no subjec-
tion,"^* The Mexican clerics and aristocrats were in-
formed that Juarez's anti-religious program as instituted
In 1857 should renain in force. This "tinsel drama" had
received its first blowl
The entire situation changed in April 1865 after the
defeat of Lee at Appomattox Court House, On October 3,
Maximilian issued a decree that henceforth all republicans
2,
were to be executed as criminals. Immediately the
United States flamed Ir^^o fury. General Grant sup-
ported General Schofield*s plan of sending 60,000 men to
fight under the deposed flag of Mexico, Indeed, Schofield
1. George Creel, The People Next Door
.
Page 233,
2, Ibid
.
Page 238,
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forwarded 30,000 muskets to Juarez, Mexican republicans
welcomed our attitude, and v/lth much gusto, invited Ameri-
cans to join the Mexican ranks. President Johnson approved
of this invitation, but Seward, more conservative, and feel-
ing that diplomatic pressure might be just as effective in
ousting the French, demanded that Napoleon III evacuate
Mexico at once. Seward had filed away in the State Depart-
ment archives the pledges which France had made and broken.
He new brought them to the attention of the French govern-
ment, and his policy was most effective.
Maximilian, seeing the eventual collapse of his Em-
pire, sought to regain the confidence of the aristocratic
and Catholic elements by restoring the Papal authority
throughout Mexico. But Maximilian was unable to secure
the financial and military support of Napoleon, who now
heeded the warning of the United States government. More-
over Napoleon needed his money and troops in i^urope. Unable
to get the necessary support of his uncle, Maximilian, who
had spent three times his revenue from Mexican taxes, and
now had fewer men in his army than his opponent, Juarez,
suffered defeat in Ivlarch 1865. President Juarez in an-
swering those who opposed the execution of Maxiraili&n,
stated, "The death of Maximilian is the death of the spirit
of intervention, v/hich under leniency, will revive again
and organize new armies against ^iexico.
1. George Creel. The People Next Door
.
Page 246.

The period 1825 to 1365 marked an attempt on the
part of the United States to promote most friendly rela-
tions with Mexico. In the first place the iynerican govern
ment did everything it could to prevent the Mexican Hexv of
1847, iimbassadors were sent to Mexico city clothed with
absolute power to adjust the Texan dispute; money was of-
fered as compensation for that territory which the inhab-
itants themselves had determined should be annexed to the
United States. Mexican leaders unjustly allowed their
subjects to think that they could defeat the United States
Even after the war our government dictated most liberal
peace terms to Mexico. 7/hat nation previous to 1847 had
so liberally treated a conquered nation?
In the second place, it cannot be contended that
United States diplomatic intervention in Mexico as against
French aggression was utterly contrary to international
law. The United States government sanctioned foreign in-
tervention for the collection of debts, a right frequently
exercised by nations, but not for the fulfillment of sel-
fish aims, France had made certain pledges, both in the
London treaty of 1861, and at other times, distinctly stat-
ing that intervention should respect the "Autonomy and
Integrity of Mexico,"
Napoleon had not only broken these sacred pledges,
but had disregarded the Monroe Doctrine, It must be under-
(5
(
stood that Seward did not mention the phrase **Monroe
Doctrine" when he warned France regarding illegal inter-
vention. It was not necessary that he should. France
had violated all for which international law stands. But
it cannot be denied that the theory'- of the Monroe Doctrine
was implied. Indeed Seward's v/aming to iilngland, Spain
and France conforms to Monroe's doctrine,—"It is impos-
sible that the allied powers should extend their political
system to any portion of either continent without endanger-
ing our peace and happiness It is equally im-
possible that we should behold such interposition in any
form v/ith indifference . "-^^
1. -Quoted by Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine
.
Page 553.
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Chapter III.
The Foreign Exploitation of Mexico.
1378 - 1917
It is only logical in the light of past Mexican
history, that the period immediately following the death
of President Juarez in 1872 should have been decidedly
turbulent. It seems to have been the lot of the Mexican
people to witness the overthrow of a well established
constitutional government by a revolutionary leader
whose army out-classed, in strength and numbers, that of
the regular army. As at the present time certain rebel
leaders are attempting to overthrow all that has been
accomplished since 1917, so in 1372 did Lerdo de Tejada
succeed in repudiating the constitution of 1357 which
Juarez swore to support. But there appeared e man des-
tined to rule Mexico for a period of thirty years,
Porfirio Diaz, and under his regime an invitation was ex-
tended to foreign nations to develop Mexico. American
financiers taking advantage of this invitation to exploit
Mexican natural resources, demanded that the American
government recognize Diaz, Thus in the latter part of
the nineteenth centurj'- our State Department adopted a new
(
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diploraatlc policy toward Mexico, which in the twentieth
century, under the administrations of Presidents Wilson,
Harding, and Coolidge, was decidedly dictated by ^iirierican
financiers. Diplomatic and military intervention in favor
of "big business" interests became a most necessary element
in our attitude toward the recognition of newly "elected"
Mexican presidents.
After the withdrawal of the French troops from
Mexico in 1867, the United States no longer continued in
that sphere its previous policy of territorial expansion.
As Seward well expressed it, my "compatriots had come to
value the dollar more, and dominion less." ICconomic pene-
tration or economic "infiltration" was to be launched as a
new policy, to be peacefully administered, yet directed
against the already stirred up hatred of Mexicans for
foreigners. Before this exploitation of Mexico had begun
in 1884 what was to be the ^erican policy? No sooner
had J'uarez returned to Llexico City to resume his duties as
president than the northern districts demanded his removal.
Secretary of State Seward determined that the United States
should aid Juarez to retain his office, even to the extent
of sending a portion of the iunerican army into I'ifexico, In
making this announcement, Seward informed the Mexcians
that it was our future policy to see their country relieved
from foreign oppression, and to support that form of govern-
ment set up by the people, free from both foreign and
{(
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United States dictation, * For the first time since 1325
liberal Mexicans considered that the safety of their nation
depended upon friendly coSperetion with the United States,
Indeed, Juarez went so far as to state that the success
of the Union depended upon the mutual sympathy and moral
support of Mexico and the United States; that the policy
of non-intervention had "proved the salvation of our
2,
country,**
Unfortunately, the good relationship between the two
countries was not destined to be of long duration. From
1868 to 1877 a series of border troubles and irritations
led to a near war, The trouble centcjred about a clause in
the treaty of 1857 between the two powers, which had created
a **free zone" six to eight miles in width along the Mexican
side of the Rio G-rande. Into this free area, i^fexican and
United States products should be shipped v/ithout the usual
customs duties. But United States officials complained of
the fact that Mexican customs officers did not cooperate
to prevent the smuggling of foreign goods into this zone,
and thence into the United States. In 1368 the United State
government asked the Mexican Congress to agree to dissolve
the "free zone" but, fearing the antagonism of the norhtern
states the Mexican Congress refused.
1. Rippey, The United States and Mexico
.
Page 276.
2. Hippey, The United States and Mexioc
^
Pags 279.

The revenue dispute was soon overshadowed b^'- border
raids into Texas by certain Mexican Indian tribes. In
spite of the attempt of the United States troops to quell
these Indian attacks, the raids became more numerous, and
the thefts of cattle greater. Finally, in 1872 Congress
appointed a committee of investigation. This prompted the
Mexican Congress to pass a similar act. Upon the return
of the Congressional Committee to Washington, a report,
most glowing, but frightful in terms, was presented. The
committee indicated that 25% of the hides exported from
Mexico contained on them the print of Texan brands, and
that another 25% showed evidences of brands being defaced.
It was estimated that damage to American property in the
1.
past few years had amounted to 927,000,000.
It is interesting to note that the Mexican commis-
sion reported that American Indian raids had taken place
in Mexico; that Texan cattle thieves had stolen cattle
in the northern districts; that Mexican Indians had been
incited by Americans to invade Texan territory, and finally,
that the American financial claims were exaggerated. In
conclusion the Mexican government suggested that both
nations patrol the border instead of leaving it to state
2,
legislation. It is the opinion of Rippey that both
1. Rippey, Th-e United States and Mexico,
.
Page 286.
2. Ibid, Page 287,
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nations exaggerated their claims, and that the belligerent
attitude of the two powers was the result of a reconstruc-
tive period after the Texan and French wars.
In spite of a more efficient patrol of the border
by armies from iv.exico and the United States, conditions
along the frontier did not materially improve. Indeed,
in 1875 Colonel MacKenzie, while prtrsuing native Mexican
Indians, penetrated into Mexican territory. It has been
a much disputed fact as to whether the United States
government sanctioned this raid. On January 16, 1873,
however. Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, noted that it
was necessary, in that the Mexican government seemed "so
powerless to prevent the Indian raide," and since the
cooperation of the Llexican government ccald not be obtained,
there was "no other alternative than to endeavor to secure
quiet on the frontier by seeking marauders and punishing
1.
theL-.!'
It is not necessary to go further into 1,he question
of Mexican - United States relations during this period of
successive raids, congressional investigations, and
sending of United States forces into Mexico. It is suffi-
cient to note that when the crisis v^ras reached in February
1876, Porfirio Diaz crossed from Texas into Mexico, and
1. Rippey, The United States and Mexico,. Page 289.

-63-
his entrance into Mexican politics marks an era of better
understanding. The Hayes administration was constantly-
prevented from going to war with iviexico, because, on the
one hand. United States senators noticed Diaz's ability to
get support and to obtain what he wanted, and, on the
other hand, American financiers were promised, if he became
president, equally as good concessions as had Great Britain
obtained in the past.
However, President Hayes was not to give Diaz
immediate support or recognition unless he guaranteed
"the preservation of peace, and order and the protection
1.
of life and property on the frontier," Furthermore, the
price of recognition would only be based upon equal con-
cessions to American financiers. Diaz v/as informed that
we would no. longer be subjected to concessions which were
not equally- as good as other foreign nations had obtained.
The United States government being more or less assured
that our ,rights would be protected under his regime, de
2.jure recognition was extended, April 9, 1878.
Further raids in iMOvember 1878 produced a final
crisis. The United States government warned Mexico "that
all indications point toward a grov/ing bitterness of feel-
ing toward the United States, and a general belief that
1. Rippey, The United States and Mexico > Page 298.
2, Priestly, The Mexican Katicn
.
Page 377.
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a war between the two countries is almost inevitable
Meanwhile the "foxy" and diplomatic Diaz who had
already become provisional president, and who had been
warned by the Mexican Congress not to negotiate with our
government, took UDon himself the powers of a dictator
and granted m.ost friendly concessions to American finan-
ciers. His treatment of our citizens, desirous of obtain-
ing financial plums, was so friendly that they returned to
the United States praising Diaz to the high Heaven. The
result was that President Hayes was practically compelled
to call a special session of Congress in October, 1877,
and Congress quizzed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Evarts, the Secretary of War, and even our Minister to
Mexico, Foster, was requested to appear at the investigation
proceedings. Foster supported Diaz, and even charged that
the administration's policy was so severe that it was ruin-
ing our commerce. It was plainly shown that the Mexican
government was trying to quell Indian raids, but could not.
Events moved rapidly, and on April 25, 1878, Hayes
supported the Ord resolution which gave the '.Var Depart-
ment the right to patrol the Rio Grande frontier with five
1.
thousand soldiers. The Mexican Congress demanded the
repeal of the act as it violated the sovereign rights of
1. Rippey, The United States and Mexico. Page 307,

Mexico, and threatened invasion. Indeed, on September
16, 1378 the war note was struck at the National Theatre
in Mexico City T7hen the audience demanded "war;" "death
to the iunericans . " finally, in February 1830, Hayes re-
pealed the Ord act,
Diaz had paid for his recognition and the Mexican
people were to suffer. Except for a period from 1880 to
1884 he was virtually a dictator of Mexican destinies
for thirty years, Diaz came into office on the wave of
enthusiasm, and it v/as destined that he should lose of-
fice because he had failed to live up to his promise to
grant freedom of election to his subjects. During his
eight terms as president, the Mexican Republic reached a
remarkable level of prosperity. But that level was reached
at a tremendous cost to the citizens of that country. In-
stead of relieving the agrarian situation, Diaz made it
worse. It will be rememb^^red that Mexico always lad been
owned by haciendados, and the period 1334 to 1911 was no
exception. Concession after concession was granted to
United States, British, French, G-eman and Dutch companies,
Not only did Mexico find her natural resources controlled by
foreigners, but large areas of valuable agricultural and
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timbsr lands as well. By successive acts in 13B4, 139E
and 1906 the old policy of government -owned natural re-
sources and sub-soil products was repudiated. The three
legislative acts stated that petroleum "was the exclusive
property of the owner of the soil,""^*
With one firm hand, Diaz suppressed insurrections
in Mexico and with the other, welcomed foreign capital.
In 1901 a veteran oil prospector from the United States,
Edward L. Doheny, began to drill wells and thus oil spec-
ulation in Mexico by Americans began. The Mexican govern-
ment leased Doheny some 475,000 acres and it is estimated
that in 1910 that one of his wells, obtained from a land
lease in 1901, produced 25,000 barrels a day, Mr, Doheny
pointed out the advantage of owning extensive areas in
Mexico when he stated that a California oil well, at the
2
most, produced only 600 barrels, *
In order to encourage investment in Mexico, Diaz
offered tax remissions for fifteen to twenty years, h.s
a result investments v/ere estimated in 1911 as follov/s:
British $321 million; French 4pl43 million; United States
#1,058 million; Mexican $793 million; all others
$119 million. By 1911, then, Mexicans owned less
1, Secretaria de Industria
.
Comercio y Trabajo . The
Mexican Petroleum Law, Page 7,
2, Hearing and Freeman - Dollar Diplomacy
.
Page 86.
3, Ibid Page 85.
cf
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than one half of all its natural resources, railroads and
lands. In 1926 ex- President Calles noted thnt Mexicans
owned less then one third of all its riches ( <,Pl
,
500, 000,000
)
and that &0% of this one third v/as in the hands of the Cath-
1.
olic church.
It is estLnated that American investments in Mex-
ican railways amounted to ^300 million in 1902, and in
1911, -$650 million. In 1902 American mining interests
came to the value of ^95 million and in 1911, -j^250 mil-
lion. Not only did our citizens invest in oil, mines and
railroads, but in Lower California, Flores, Hole and Com-
pany of San Francisco purchased thousands of acres for
the protection of archilla. McCormick of Chicago leased
or purchased some 50,000 to 5 million acres for the devel-
opment and protection of the Mague; fiber. Lands were
likewise purchased for the growing of sugar, coffee,
rubber, cotton and tropical plants. Indeed, it was estim-
ated in 1912 that American financiers owned $105 million
2.
in "plantation, haciendado and tiiiiber properties.". Just
what attitude did the Mexican people take toward this
Influx of capital? They could not deny that it haa brou^t
about the prosperity of Mexico, it had bettered the mat-
erial welfare of the nation, it had created a higher stan-
1. Mexico Before the World - Calles, Page 179-192.
2. Rippey - The United States and Mexico, ^ages .^15 to 316.

dard of living, and lastly, it had "brought much money into
the Mexican treasury, and the government was thereby able
to pay off some of its outstanding obligations. Eut the
Mexicans thoroughly realized the price paid for the build-
ing up of their nation. The lower class of people v/ho
were deprived of their lands and did not benefit, finan-
cially from this exploitation, became more hostile to for-
eigners. This outburst of hatred became more prominent
betv/een the years 1911 and 1917. It was felt that for-
eigners knowing that Mexico needed money took advantage
of the fact and made profits accordingly. Official oppo-
sition was expressed in 1878 by a Mexican congressman -
"would you, deputies of the state, exchange your beautiful
and poor liberty for the present, for the rich subjection
1.
which railroads (built by foreigners) give you?"
Opposition to foreign financial intervention was
openly expressed in several Mexican newspapers in 1881.
"La Patria" and "Frait d 'Union" noted that now Texas, Cal-
ifornia, New Mexico and Western Indian territory was ceded,
Mexico would be lost to her "Northern Neighbors" unless
the government prevented further exploitation. These
newspapers felt that Catholicism would be overrun by "the
thousand religious sects which exist in the United States."
1. Rlppey, The. United States and Mexico, Page 320.

-59-
that the Spanish language and customs would be obliterated
and that the Mexican himself would become a slave to pri-
vate capital.
On the other hand, tv/o writers of note, Enriquez
and Castellanos, in their treatises on "Some Mexican Prob-
lems" canie to the conclusion that the Mexican himself was
the most dangerous element involved in a possible foreign
domination. If Pan - Americanism was stressed sufficiently
and the Mexicans knew how to preserve peace, foment progress,
increase riches, and "work quietly for their own evolution,
they will have nothing to fear from Americansa." How true
these sane statements are.' If only the Mexican v/ould
cooperate with his government for the safeguarding of the
constitution, and would heavily back those leaders whose
very existence are necessary for the continuation of Mex-
ican sovereignty, foreign political and financial domination
would have ceased in the past and will cease in the future.
But it seems to be the Mexican psychology that a strong
leader is a dangerous man to have at the helm of the "ship
of state.-" Until this idea is eradicated, Mexico cannot
expect peace and security]
ViThat elements, then, were responsible for the con-
tinued rule of Diaz for nearly thirty years? In the first

-eo-
place Diaz may be characterized as a reformer, a supporter
of the constitution of 1856, a man of "daring resource and
will His ability won the support of the upper classes,
and the Indian was aiade to conform to his policies. Clever
bandits were incorporated into the rural police forces;
astronomical and me terological education was stressed; the
army was reduced to a minimum; railroads were built; har-
bors improved; and lastly, congress became "merely plastic
clay.." By making congress "merely plastic clay," and
bribing those comgressmen who opposed him, Diaz becaiae a
dictator. His dictatorial powers were so strongly en-
forced, and his personality so great that the dissatis-
faction of the peons seemed to be kept under the surface.
The peon had a just right to object to the new economic
policy of Mexico. In 1866 a law was enacted which allowed
all illegally held lands to pass into the hands of the
state. Many peons and I.iestizos had failed to register
their
purchased areas, and consequently/lands were seized and
often sold to foreigners. The result was that in 1910
90% of the villages along the central plateaus were left
landless, and many of these peons who had lost their lands
were compelled to join the ranks of agricultural laborers
who were held in bond by debt. The census of 1910 showed
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that 6000 haciendados owned 550,000 acres of land, whereas
only one fourth of the total amount of land v;as in the
possession of those residing in small towns (communes)
and on small farras. It was estimated that 60^ of the total
population (peons de compo) were held in debt service as
1.
laborers,
Diaz had a great opportunity during his peaceful
re'^gime to encourage the passing of laws beneficial to
those classes which had always been oppressed by the
governing factions. Yet, as all other leaders had done,
legislation benefited the v/ealthier people only. To us,
revolts and restlessness have conveyed a false idea. To
the enslaved, oppressed and down trodden masses there has,
however, been a common end, notably, full economic, poli-
tical and social equality. The revolutions led by Madera,
Huerta and Carranza were for this prupose , and the con-
stitution of 1917 guaranteed the basic principles of the
rights of man.
Almost one hundred years after the uprising of
Hidalgo, Franciso Madero in May 1911 heeded the cry of
oppression and attempted to oust Diaz. It is sometirass
insinuated that not only was this revolution instigated
by peons and other oppressed factions, but by ^erican cap-
italists who were jealous of and who feared British domin-
1. Moon - Imperialism and ^Torld Politics
.
Page 440.
1
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ation of fche finanoial ste^tus of Mexico. It is a well
knov7n fact that Diaz was dominated by his friend, a Brit-
ish subject, Lord Cowdray. Lord Cowdray was able to obtain
valuable oil concessions for British financiers, and by 1910
it looked as though the British interests would outclass
1.
all other rivals. It is not to be surmised that Madero*s
revolution was financed by innerican interests. There is
plenty of evidence to prove that Kiadero, a representative
of Mexico *s new financial po7/er, was wealthy. Madero was
able to ally his own class, and, upon the promise of
social changes, the loT-zer classes against the dictator
Diaz and the landed aristocrats who had upheld the latter*
s
administrative acts.
The first legislation of importance, after the
overthrow of Diaz on May 1, 1911, and which in itself was
indicative that all classes of people should elect the
next president, was an act providing for, and guaranteeing
fair elections. On October 1, 1911, Madero was elected
to fill the office so suddenly vacated by Porfirio Diaz.
The United States government promptly recognized Madero,
President Taft considered this new Mexican leader a friend
of the United States, and when a revolt broke out in 1912
1. Hearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy
.
Page 87.
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the American government prohibited the selling of arms
to any rebel factions."^' Madero, being unable to divide
among the landless those large areas which v/ere controlled
by the aristocracy and other vested interests, found him-
self compelled to resign in February 191?. Felix Diaz, a
nephe;T of the former president, supported by Madero^s
own commander-in-chief of the army, Iluerta, was able to
seize Vera Cruz and i«fexico City. Kuerta killed Madero,
and made himself president. To be sure, elections for the
new presidential candidate were held, but Huerta saw to it
that he 'vas elected. President Wilson refused to recog-
nize him as the new de jure president because Huerta had
murdered Madero; had failed to hold a fair election, and
lastly, because he did not have control over the whole
country.
Much criticism was forthcoming because Wilson re-
fused to recognize Huerta as the legal president of Mex-
ico, In spite of the fact that Great Britain, France,
Italy, Gpain, Portugal, Russia, Belgium, Denmark, and
Japan tendered recognition, Wilson continued a policy of
3.
"watchful waiting,"
1. Nearing and Freeman, Dollar Di-plomacy
.
Page 90,
2. Review of Reviews, "From Diaz to Carranz£. . " Vol. 53, Page 197,
3. Foreign Relations of the United States . 1913, Page '^CO;
805-807.
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to Huerta to ask him to agree to resign in order that
free elections might be held. Upon the refusal of the
President of that Latin-American nation to do so, Wilson
issued the following statement: "Just government rests
always upon the consent of the governed, and there can be
no freedom without order based upon law and upon the pub-
lic conscience and approval,
Again in regard to our policy of non-intervention
and anti-imperialism //ilson stated:- "The United States
has nothing to seek in Central and South America except
the lasting interests of the people ^f the two continents,
the security of governments intended for the people and
for no special group and interests, and the development
of personal and trade relationships between the two con-
tinents which shall redound to the profit and advantage
of both, and interfere with the rights and liberties of
neither," ^*
Some authorities think that VYilson only accentua-
ted civil strife in Mexico by not recognizing Huerta;
others based his non-recognition upon the fact that
Huerta was a representative of the feudal landholders,
and i^'ould therefore not support any Mexican leader who
1, .Quoted by Rippey, The United States and Mexico
.
Page 333.
2. International Year Book
. 1913, Page 72S.
KC
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v;ould tend to follow the policy of Diaz in granting exten-
sive concessions to English financiers. Indeed, one
observer stated,- "That the Huerta forces have maintained
Diaz policy of antagonism to American oil interests, and
1.
friendship to Lord Cowdray is apparent.
"
It was frequently stated that American oil inter-
ests had kept Madero in power, but that British interests
would keep Euerta in as President of Mexico. Eventually,
hov/ever, the British ambassador because of infetructions
from his foreign office informed Huerta on October 27,
1913 that his policies of cruelty wo^^ld no longer be
supported. Hereafter, therefore, the Mexican policy was
2,
to be dominated by the United States and not Mexico.
In spite of the fact that Great Britain gave us a
free hand in our negotiations with Huerta, the British
foreign office criticised our policy. It was stated in
English papers that Wilson 's policy of "watchful waiting"
and sending of ultimatums was not a humane course to
follow. It was recommended that the only vvay to quell dis-
orders in Mexico was to intervene and annex that country.
In the light of past history, namely, the French revolu-
tionary struggles, the cutting off of financial support
1. 'Quoted by Wearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy
, P. 90,
2. Rippey, The United States and Mexico ^ Page 336.

-66-
had not weakened the Jacobins, and neither did it the
Mexican revolutionists under the leadership of Carranza
and Villa. Such a policy as pursued was merely a post-
ponement of ultimate fighting to attain the purpose de-
sired. It was not America's aim that the British Dress
attacked, but its m.ethod. Sir Edward Grey felt that
since the Monroe Doctrine would not allow foreign cooper-
ation in adjusting matters in Mexico that the United
States was m.orally bound to protect the lives and property
1.
of foreign citizens.
On the other hand, what was the opinion of un-
biased Mexican authorities? Bulnes, a Mexican politician
of some note, protested against Wilson's oolicy Dursued dur-
ing 1915, 1914 and 1915 in that it denied the peoples' right
to revolt. Only through revolt had any nation obtained its
rights. His criticism of Wilson was most violent for sup-
porting one m^an as against another. Bulnes pointed out that
in the first place Y.'ilson should have given Carranza de
facto recognition in 1913, rather than Huerta. Wilson
knew that Carranza was a constitutionalist, and he like-
wise was cognizant of the fact that Huerta was a bureau-
1. Spectator
,
" The Issues in Mexico '; Vol. 112, Page 730.
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crat. It was Bulnes' opinion that, if you read b-^tween the
lines of iVilson*s speeches, we supported that leader who
rould give us the best concessions. Continuing, it was
pointed out that foreign capital, if invested in legitimate
business, would not cause foreign intervention, nor would
there be any objection to flrancial investments on the
1.
pert of the Mexicans themselves if used for that purpose.
Needless to say certain iouericans favored inter-
vention to oust Huerte. It was felt that American inter-
ests were being sacrificed at the cost of a revolution
led by the Villa - Carranza - Huerta group. It has been
already indicated that many ixraericans considered Huerta
had been financially supported b^' British interests.
Meanwhile, V/ilson and his cabinet were waiting to see if
the people, no longer supported through United States
arms and money, would not tire themselves out and the re-
volution would die a natural death. Then and only then
would we intervene to set the tiexican political machinery
in order.
The fact that the United States continually re-
fused to extend de jure recongition to Huerta only tended
1. See Eulnes, ?, , The vYhole Truth about Mexico . -
President V/ilson*s Responsibility.
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to embarrass him in foreign relations and to aid his ene-
mies at home. Carranza and Villa in December 1913 seized
the Nothern provinces, and wended their way on to Tampico.
On April 8, 1914 the port and oil center of Tamipco was
taken. What attitude did Wilson take toward the Carranza-
Villa alliance? It is most assured that Wilson favored
Carranza in that he lifted the arms embargo in favor of
Carranza on February 3, 1914. Thus supported by American
arms it was fairly easy for Carranza to be successful in
all future combats A'ith Huerta, The State Department
not only supplied the rebel faction with arms, but that
support implied:- "not only would the United States dic-
tate to Mexico as to who shall not be president, but it
would also dictate as who shall, and that in this regu-
lation of Mexico's affairs it v/ould not share with any of
the European Powers." Kot only did Wilson materially aid
Carranza, but Doheny emphatically stated that American
1.
oil interests supported him as well.
After Tampico had been practically seized by Car-
ranza, three American marines who had landed at Tampico
on April 10, 1914 were tfeken by Huerta 's officials. Upon
1. Moon, Imperialism and '.Vorld Politics, Page 443.
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the protest of the American government these marines were
released, and Huerta apologized. Admiral Mayo who had
coioiaand of the American fleet in Caribbean waters demanded
that Huerta give a salute of tv/enty-one guns to the United
States flag. The Mexican President agreed to conform with
the demand if we would reciprocate. Wilson refused to
comply with his request in that he feared such would be a
virtual recognition of the Huerta government. On the 18th
of April 'jVilson issued an ultimatum further demanding the
salute, and upon being unable to coerce Huerta, asked
Congress to permit him to use force. On the 21st day of
April American troops entered Vera Cruz, a seizure of
1.
munitions and the customs house following.
President Wilson's nev/ policy of intervention was
based upon a right as guaranteed by international jurists.
It is a recognized principleof international law that if
a nation's flag is insulted, and just demands to remedy
the situation are not forthcoming, then that nation in-
2.
jured has the right of intervention.
Let us pause a moment to get the Mexican verdict
on the Tampico case. According to Mexican officials,
naval guards were within their legal bounds to seize the
1. U. S. Foreign Relations. . 1914, Page 443.
2. Stowell, Intervention and International Law,. Page 21,
<5r
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three marines who attempted to land at Tampico without
the consent of the authorities, Huerta pointed out that
these guards merely had exercised instructions given to
them, and after recognizing their mistake had released
the American marines. The Mexican government in due
form apoligized, and punished those whom the United
States government had accused of exercising undue author-
ity, Huerta refused to salute the United States flag for
fear that he might humiliate his country. There cer-
tainly is evidence to show that the United States might
have seized the opportunity to intervene, basing such
intervention upon international law. The American
Charg* d'Affaires in Mexico City, Nelson 0 ' Shaughnessy,
cabled the State Department that the return salute by
the United States was "the best arrangement that could
be made," And Mrs, 0 ' Shaughnessy wrote from the Mex-
ican Embassy on April 25, "that we are destroying these
people and there is no way out. We seem to have taken
1.
advantage of their distress,"
Whatever may be the opinion, it seems logical
that both parties were to blame. The South American
countries seemed to think that both nations were wrong
in their actions pursued at Tampico. For that reason
1. Quoted by Nearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy,
Pages 102 and 103,

Argentina, Brazil and Chile offered to mediate, and
on May 20, 1914 representatives from the A. B. C.
powers, Mexico and the United States gathered at
Niagara Falls. At this meeting an attempt was made
to oust Huerta from office and to get articles of
peace signed. Because nothing constructive. and de-
finite was accomplished to soothe the relations
between United States and Mexico, Huerta was forced
1.
to resign on July 15, 1914,
From July 15, 1914 until the beginning of
1917 civil war raged within Mexico. Shortly after
Carranza seized luexico City in August, 1914, his
commander-in-chief of the army. Villa, broke off re-
lations with him. As a result Carranza was forced
to relinquish control of the city on Nove^iber 23,
1914, and with his army retired to Vera Cruz which
city the United States forces had already evacuated.
From the time Carrar.za had left Mexico City to July
1915, there had been elected six provisional presi-
dents by the Mexican Congress. In desperation, six
diplomats from the Central snd South American coun-
tries attempted to gather at a conference those armed
1. Survey, "Bandit Colonies '.' Haberman, R.^ Vol. 52,
Page 148.
i
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leaders attempting to get control of Mexico. Villa
readily assented to attend but Carranza refused.
Finally, on October 18, 1915 these same diplomats
issued a decree that that government to seize Mexico
City within three weeks should be recognized. On
October 19, 1915 Carranza was able to take the city,
and accordingly was granted recognition by the United
States and eight Central and South American countries.
Thus did Carranza come into power, not duly elected
as Wilson had notified Huerta he must be, but virtually
"shot into government."
Wilson was an idealist, and at the beginning
of his administration it was his grim determination
in so far as Mexico was concerned, that "just govern-
ment rests upon the consent of the governed," Did
7)filson mean that there should be freedom of elections?
Certainly Huerta was asked by John Lind, a special
envoy sent by Wilson to Mexico in 1913, to resign in
order that fair election might take place. Again at
the conference at Niagara Falls in 1915, the American
delegation asked that a constitutionalist be luade pro-
visional president of Mexico until electives supervised
by a United States army should elect a constitutional
V
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1.
president. Furthermore, Colonel House wrote to W. H.
Payne - "It Is to be the policy of this administration
henceforth not to recoenize any central American govern-
ment that is not formed along consti National lines*
Or was this policy of Wilson to be modified during the
latter part of his first adiriini strati on to mean that the
"Wilson doctrine" should not only be opposition to finan-
cial imperialism, but disapprovement to revolutions and
dictatorships in Latin - America; that this government
was to insist in the future upon an orderly, constitu-
tional and democratic government, not directly implying
freedom of elections? Did Page best interpret the policy
by stating that the new "Wilson doctrine" should be, if
necessary, "shooting men into self-government?"
Certainly, it cannot be denied that Wilson changed
his ideas by 1916, otherwise Carranza vi/ould not have
gotten into office. Can we not conclude by saying that
Carranza, a constitutionalist, best represented the inter-
ests of the United States? Was he not much more friendly
to tre American government and business interests then
Villa? From the past financial history of the United
1. Wearing and Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy p. 110,
2. Moon - Iiiiperialism and World ^oiitics p. 443.

states, the author is led to believe that iVilson was com-
pelled by a small group of financiers to adopt the policy
of intervention that he did. Indeed, Tumulty states that
when those who had land, mineral and oil investments in
Mexico v/ere demanding intervention in Mexico, V/ilson re-
plied: "I have to pause and remind myself that I am Presi-
dent of the United States and not of a small group of Amer-
icans with vested interests in J^lexico Whether the
State Department took the initiative in protecting finan-
cial interests in Mexico, or v/hether ^erican financiers
demanded that protection is for one to conclude himself.
There is sufficient evidence that each assumed its share,
working under the international theory that for the protec-
tion of one's vested interests a government shall intervene
forcibly or diplomatically, to protect the property of its
nationals.
No sooner had Carranza been put into office than
Villa, stung by defeat, staged a "coup d'etat" in an at-
tempt either to eventually seize the government at Mex-
ico City, or to make the iVilson government suffer for
what it had done in not permitting him to become presi-
1. Tumulty, 'ffilson -q-s I Know i'^lm
.
Page 146,
(t
t
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dent. On March 9, 1916 Villa with 3000 men raided
Columbus, I\ew Mexico, burning the town and killing
1.
nineteen American Citizens, The clamor for American
invasion of Mexico, in order to prevent further raids
was demanded not only by American citizens, but by United
States Army generals stationed along the frontier, Wil-
son complied with the request by announcing to Congress
that a "punitive expedition" was to be sent into Mexico.
According to Wilson's interpretation of the phrase^
"punitive ex,.edition " meant the invasion of a backward
2.
nation unable to quell disorders ..ithin its boundaries.
Forthwith, a call for volunteers was issued, and General
Pershing with a force of 12p00 Hien marched into Llexico
on March 15 to pursue Villa,
Immediately after the Columbus raid President
Carranza forwarded a long message to the Ar^erican govern-
ment in which he expressed regret for the "lamentable
incident" at Columbus. In his message he asked that the
United States sign a reciprocal treaty wherein the troops
of each nation might pursue Mexican bandits over the
international boundary. The agreement as accepted by
N. Y. Times
,
March 10, 1916, Page 1.
2, Moon - Imperialism and .Vorld Politics, Page 445.
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President Wilson specifically stated that the cooperation
of both nations was necessary to kill Villa, but under
no circumstances should the troops of either nation go
into the towns, or forty miles beyond the border. On
March 11, Carranze tried to ada further provisions to
the agreement, such as,- neither army should be composed
of more than 1000 men, nor should the expedition be per-
mitted in either territory for a period of more than
1.
five days except under unusual circumstances. The
State Department rejected the araendments of March 11,
and as a result Carranza tried to back out of the pro-
posal of March 10.
Under the direction of General Pershing, and
Major Tompkins the punitive expedition reached Parrel
April 12. Here a skirmish took place, not betv/een the
Villistas and United States troops, but with the forces
of Carranza. The conflict showed that the Mexicans
objected to the "invasion," and as a result President
Carranza on the following day, April 15, demanded the
immediate withdrawal of our troops claiming that we
had undertaken the expedition without the tacit consent
1. International Year Book, 1916, Page 421.
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1.
of the Mexican government.
On Ivlay 5, 1916 the Villistas attacked Glen Springs,
Texas, The result was an increase in the ^erican Army
along the international border so that by the end of 1916
it numbered about 100,000. The raid at Glen Springs
broke up a Conference at ^1 Paso which was in the process
of negotiating the withdrawal of iimerican troops. The
relationship between Carranza and Vifilson became even
more serious when on iviay 22, the former demanded the abso-
lute withdrawal of the -American forces from Mexican soil,
Carranza questioned the sincerity of the <7ilson " "punitive
expedition", and charged that we were violating Mexican
sovereignty. • To this address Secretary Lansing replied,
denying that it was our intention to establish ourselves
in Mexico by pursuing bandits across the international bar
der. For two years the V/ilson administration had waited
for border raids to subside, and since they had not, and
since Carranza apparently did not intend that they should,
the United States had no intention of v/ithdrav/ing its
3.
troops, :iventual withdrawal of the United States Army
did not take place until the end of December, 1916, It is
1. Amer. Journal of International Law . Vol. X, Page 167,
2. International Year Book
. 1916, Page 423,
3. Ibid, Page 423.
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thought that the war going on in f.iirope necessitated the
evacuation. It is to be noted that no agreement could
be reached with Carranza v/herein it was possible to
create a better feeling between the tv;o powers. This
same bitter attitude toward Mexico was destined to last
until 1928.
American intervention into Mexico, or much better
termed a "punitive expeditioi., " was entirely legal. It
is apparent that Carranza withdrew his note of :;!arch 10,
1916 which provided for co'operation in quelling the bor-
der raids because of opposition at ho.ae. If international
law upholds the invasion of United States troops into
Mexico in 1836 to punish Indian invaders, certainly the
expedition in 1916 was justified. It is the duty of
every state to so administer its laws in time of peace
as to prevent private persons from organizing and arming
for the purpose of invading a neighboring state. "Tem-
porary invasion of the territory of an adjoining country
when necessary to prevent and check crime, 'rests upon
principles of the law of nations entirely distinct from
those on v/hich war is justified upon immutable principles
of self-defense - upon the principles which justify deci-
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sive measures of precaution to prevent irreparable evil
1.
to our own or to a neighboring people*".
The period betv/een 1678 and 1917 marks a departure
from pfst diplomatic history with Mexico which was almost
entirely based upon territorial expansion. The financial
exploitation of Mexico by the United States and foreign
nations was inevitable. Poor bankrupt Mexico needed
money, and the easiest way to earn it was to sell its
lands, and grant valuable concessions. As a result the
political domination of Mexico by these vested interests
became a reality. Since international law recor-nizes
the right of any sovereign power to protect its property
and citizens, the only logical outco.ue was foreign ap"?rres-
sion. Certainly the United States, through supporting
iviadero and Carranza has obtained a wide field in v/hich
to invest. It is most difficult, then, with these his-
torical facts in view to condemn any one nation for the
financial exploitation of Mexican riciies. It v/as a case
of British-American competition for concessions, and for-
tunately or unfortunately, the latter power won out. The
real test of v.hether the United States should politically
1. ictuoted by Taylor, International Public Law, Page 405.
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dominate Mexico to protect its interests came to a cli-
max under Wilson's administration. Although V/ilson's
ideals would have formed a most unbiased policy to pur-
sue, nevertheless an ever grasping group of financiers
who had invested heavily in Mexico, and who wanted still
larger profits through further grants, slightly changed
V/ilson*s anti-imperialistic scheme into one very badly
tinged with imperialism. But Mexico was not yet to be
dominated by Yankee or foreign gold. The Constitution
of 1917 was to be her "cry of halt!"
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Chapter IV.
Diplomatic Relations 1917-1929.
The Future of Mexico Lies in Her
Ability to Enforce the Constitution
of 1917.
To Presidents Carranza and Calles should be attri-
l5Uted the success in being able to advance the political,
social and economic interests of the mestizo and peon
classes. Only through their untiring efforts has it
been possible to extend to the working classes those
rights for which they, undaunted, struggled for over one
hundred years. The path to constitutional liberty, free
from the political domination of the church and foreign
nations, has been obtained only through the "iron-willed"
efforts of ex-President Calles. It is now up to the
Mexican to support these reforms, and to refuse to "swallow"
the revolutionary oratory of certain notorious politicians
who seek to enrich themselves at the expense of the work-
ing class itself.
I
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The revolution of 1917, then, was not for the
usual personal political gain, but for the economic and
social advancement of all classes as a whole. It is to
be remembered that Mexico's first revolution in 1825 tend-
ed to do away with the domination of the Gochupines or
Spanish-born: the revolution of 1856 went farther and
attempted to break the DOwer of the clergy, and the re-
volution of 1917 has wr-ested autocratic control from the
hands of the haciendado. In 1915 President Wilson and
the oil interests took the government out of the hands
Huerta, a supporter of the feudal landlords, and in plac-
ing it into the power of Carranza, a constitutionalist,
actually produced a final revolution for economic and
social equality.
Carranza called a constitutional convention on
December 2, 1916, and on February 5, 1917, the constitu-
1.
tion in its final form was promulgated. The document in
general guarantees freedom of press, speech, religion,
Jury trial, congressional representation, election of a
president every four years, universal suffrage; and such
social changes as the following,- eight hour day, mini-
mum wage scale, public health department, confiscation
of church property (with exceptions), separation of
church and state; and such economic reforms as the
1, See for future references - The Mexican Constitution
of 1917 - Annals of American Academy of Political
and Social Sc. Supp . May 1917.
i
division of lands, and the nationalization of all "sub-
soil products ."
After the constitution of 1917 had been adopted,
France, England and the United States ir mediately object-
ed to Article 27 which in Section I states that "the
ownership of lands and waters comprised within the limits
of the national territory is vested originally in the
Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit
title thereof to orivate persons, thereby constituting
private property."
Continuing, this section explains that orivate
property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of
public utility, and only by indemnification. "The Nation
shall have at all times the right to impose on private
property such limitations as the public interest demands,
as well as the right to regulate the development of natu-
ral resources ,"
Furthermore, only Mexicans by birth or naturali-
zation, and Mexican ccmpanies have the right to acquire
ownership in lands, or to obtain concessions to develop
mines. This same right, the constitution definitely
states, shall be granted to foreigners if an agreement is
signed whereby all property leased or acquired, by con-
cession or grant, is to remain subject to the regulation
of Mexican laws, and lastly, that the foreigner obtaining
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such rights shall not Invoke the diplomatic aid of his
1.
country.
It can be readily noticed then that the Mexican
government has repudiated those congressional acts of
1884, 1892, and 1906 which gave the owner of land com-
plete liberty to exploit Mexican riches. Indeed, the
article is explicit in this matter. To repeat,- in the
"Nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or
substances which in veins, masses, or beds constitute
deposits whose nature is different from the components
of the lana . "
Foreign nations have not been anxious to accept
Article 27 of the Mexican constitution. England went so
far in 1926 as to recall her minister, and the United
States sent note after note to Calles warning him that
the government at Yifashington would not tolerate laws which
tended to be confiscatory and retroactive. It was the
basis of contention that American financiers had been guar
anteed full property rights by the successive acts of 1884
1892 and 1906. To these rore or less belligerent gesture
the Mexican government replied that Diaz had exceeded his
authority in granting foreigners the right to exploit the
riches of Mexico. The State Department of that Latin-
American nation pointed out that the Leyes de Indies
(Laws of the Indies) of 1518 passed on to the Spanish
i. Mexican Constitution, Article 27.
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crown the "right of conquest of all mines in Mexico,
either discovered or not known." -tigain in 1783 Charles III
of Spain issued the "mining ordinances (Ordenanzos de Min-
erla) for New Spain," stating that the mines were by nature
and origin the property of the Spanish crown. Under no
condition, continued the ordinance, should his subjects
separate them from the "Royal Patrimony." Should Kis
Majesty*s people not abide by his decision, then those con-
cessions granted were to be forfeited.''"* Based upon this
historical docximent, the Department of Commerce in 1812
declared that Mexico did come into possession of these
"same bituminous substances which form a part of its
direct domain which is inalienable and imprescriptible.
By no means does the Mexican government pretend in any
v/ay to place barriers upon foreign investments in Mexico,
but on the contrary she desires to grant all kinds of facil-
ities to those coming from foreign countries; to extend to
them a portion of her fortune and good '//ill; to share with
her the gifts of her territory.
Much discussion, covering a ten-year period, has
centered about the ancient Leyes de Indies. Did not Diaz
have a right as president of lilexico to abolish these fix-
tures of antiquities; these barriers to foreign investments
1. fhe Petroleum Law . Mexican Commerce Dept. Pages 1-5.
t
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in Mexico? ?/ere the laws, the Leyes de Indices, legally
sanctioned by the Spaniards themselves, or were they mere-
ly the Enactments of a despotic monarch? According to
a judicial interpretation by an eminent writer in the Amer-
ican Law Review for 1921, confiscation dates back to the
founding of the right, and retroaction is seizure after
the right is obtained in good faith upon the invitation
of the government. The writer goes on to state that re-
troaction is oonosed to fairness and justice by the oeo-
1.
pie of every free government. Distinguished scholars
have noted that the Spanish government upheld the right
that a despotic ruler did not, according to Roman law,
have the right to confiscate territory without compensa-
tion. Yet orevious to 1928 there was confiscation when-
ever land owners refused to meet the requirements of
2.
Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917.
In reply to the theory that no government h^s a
right to confiscate property without compensation. Presi-
dent Carranza retorted that New Spain had the privilege
to seize prooerty in that "Christ having been constituted
monarch of the world, passed on his power to St. Peter
and his successors, and with it that of charging the kings
(under the jurisdiction of the Pope) with the subjugation
1. American Law Review, "The Mexican Constitution ;^ Goither, R.B.,
Vol. 55, Paere 481.
2. Ibid. Page 448.
i
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of un-Christian countries." Continuing, Carranza con-
cluded that since Spain had the right to exploit the lands
of New Spain, as guaranteed by the Leyes de Indies and the
Church, so did the Mexican government inherit these despot-
1.
ic powers.
Yet in reply to the decision that has been upheld
by certain Jurists that the Leyes de Indies were illegal
according to Roman law, we have lawyers in this country who
support the Mexican viewpoint. The United States claims
the impossibility of "ownership" of oil while it is in
the " self-migratory" state. But cases are cited wherein
the Supreme Court of our country has sanctioned the right
2.
to regulate natural resources such as oil and gases. In
the case of the Ohio Oil Com.pany versus Indiana, the
courts upheld the opinion that a state has the sovereign
right over its oil and gas which is in the ground, and
therefore can -nrevent its extraction. "This necessarily
implied legislative authority is borne out by the analogy
suggested by things ferae naturae (wild by nature) which
it is unquestioned the legislature has the authority to
forbid all from taking, in order to protect them from un-
due destruction, so that the right of common owners,
1. American Law Review, ^he -I.IexicRn Constitution
,
Goither, R. B., Vol. 55, Page 485.
2. Supreme Court Reports
, Ohio Oil Co. vs. Indiana '( 1889
)
177 u. S. 192; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co,
(1911) 220 U.S. 61; and vmils vs. Midland Carbon Co.
(1920) 254 U. S. 300,
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the public, to reduce to possession, may be ultimately
efficaciously en joyed
From the foregoing decision it is concluded thsit
oil is in the first place, by nr.ture, wild, is migratory
and is liable to escape from under the ground while owned
in fee simple by the ovmer of the land, Secondly, the
fee simple owner does not absolutely ov/n the migratory oil
in the earth beneath his land; thirdly ownership is sub-
ject to the right of the power of the state to regulate,
control and have "dominio directo'* (direct dominion) over
oil in the earth and taken therefrom; and lastly, the
right to regulate for the "benefit, protection, welfare
and safety of the community, the public, and the state,"
cannot be denied.
There is no doubt that Carranza had a very weak
argument v;hen he indicated that the church protected the
right of New Spain to own the sub-soil products, ilven
though that right was inherited in 1612 it could not be
accepted in the twentieth century by a country denouncing
the power of the Catholic Church. There is no q^uestion
that the constitution of 1917, and as modified in 1925,
was confiscatory and retroactive, but there is evidence
1, v^uoted by Calles, Mexico Before the World - Page 254.
2. Ibid . Page 235.
tr t
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as Hawkes indicates, that the United States State Depart-
ment has not lived up to the interpretation of the high-
est court of the land. Hovvever, we shall see that even-
tually the Mexican Supreme Court in 1923 retracted its
steps and recognized on the one hand, that the seizure of
property acquired previous to Ivlay 1, 1917 was retroactive,
and on the other, decreed a right to control the output of
oil for the public welfare*
Leaving for the moment the judicial side of the oil
controversy, what diplomacy was utilized by our govern-
m.ent in obtaining a revision of x^rticle 27? The first
official objection was presented on June 29, 1918 by Pres-
ident Wilson who stated, "all the United States asks for
its citizens who have investments in Mexico, relying on
the good faith and justice of the Mexican government and
Mexican laws, is justice and fair dealings. Hov/ever, the
seizure of property at the will of the sovereign, without
due legal process equitably administered and without pro-
vision for just compensation has always been regarded as
a denial of justice and a cause for diplomatic representa-
tion So far as my government is aware no provi-
sion has been made by your excellency's government fcr just
compensation for such arbitr^rj'- divestment of right nor for
the establishment of any tribunal invested with the func-
tions of determining justly and fairly what indemnifications
t
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are due to iiraerican interests."
Again American oil financiers had dictated the Amer-
ican policy in Mexico. V/ith t:he support of »7ashington, the
leading oil companies in Mexico refused to abide by the new
constitution or to recognize the legality of the Carranza
government to enforce Article 27 by nationalizing the oil
wells. The Anaconda interests formed the "National Associa-
tion of Protection of American Rights in Mexico" with e
press branch on Fifth itvenue , I^ew ^ork, to spread propaganda,
and eventually get the public to demand, by force if neces-
sary, the repeal of this obnoxious legislation passed by
the Mexican Congress in 1917, Doheny offered McAdoo, Wil-
son *s son-in-law, a million-dollar retainer if he vmuld di-
rect the affairs of our government and the opinion of //ilson
2,
into the channels of armed or diplomatic intervention.
The Herding administration pursued the sf^me policy as
'»7ilson, with the exception that Fall, a personal friend of the
Doheny interests, became a member of Harding* s cabinet. The
government from 1920 to liarding's death in 1922 was "saturated"
with oil, and Doheny went to the Capitol with ^100,000 in a
suitcase "as a loan from an old friend,"
Tfith a representative of the oil interests in tVashing-
ton, Harding naturally refused to recognize the new
3
1. American Lew Review, loither, R.B. "The Mexican Constitution "
Vol. 55, Page 496.
2. Moon: Imperialism end World Politics . Page 446,
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President of Mexico, Obregon, who came into office in
1920. For t\70 years the price of Obregon recognition,
namely, that Article 27 should not be used retroactively
to the prejudice of oil concessions acquired nrior to
1917, dangled above the head of Mexico new chief exec-
utive. Finally, in 1922 Obregon made a settlement with
the Morgan firm fcr the resumption of interest on a
$500,000,000 debt end recognition was extended."^' Once
more American oil interests had won the day and the State
Department had been compelled to bov/ to iimerican investors
in I.IexicoI
^^hen one stops to consider the vast amount of wealth
which American financiers had spent in Mexico, for selfish
or unselfish purposes, there can be no wonder that the aid
of both Wilson* s emd Harding* s administrations was sought.
Even at the present time one is led to lelieve that United
States' investors are blaming the Catholic church for the
revolt, v.fhen in reality they are partly responsible. The
Mexican laws, even though modified in 1928, are still objec
tionable to many oil well owners. It is amazing to note
the rapidity by which Americans have increased their hold-
ings in Mexico, In 1902 it is estimated that we had in-
vested $500. million in gold; by 1911, 1 billion; and by
1912, 4^1,057,770,000, and by 1926, Si"^l, 230, 000, 0001*^* By
1926 practically 40^o of Mexican riches were owned by the
1. Moon; Im.pe rialism and '.7orld Politics . Page 447,
(Dunn:
2. ( American Foreign Investments . Page 30,
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United States investors, and only one-third, #1,500,000,000
1.
by Mexicans themselves!
Dunn indic&;:es that of this $1,230,000,000 invested
in Mexico, #479,000,000 'fias in oil lands and refineries,
#300,000,000 in mining and smelting, and over ^200,000,000
2.
in plantations and timber lands, ±s.s it can be seen, aitb r-
ican investments in oil outnumbered all others. Indeed, in
1919, V^. S. Gulbertson stated that "-american companies pro-
duced 70^c of the Mexican crude oil production."
With these data in mind it it is to be judged that th«f
State Department of the United States after 1924 continued
to exercise much influence over i-iexican politics. But it
suffered a most severe blow in 1924 when Calles became
President of Mexico. On December 31, 1925, the i»Iexican
President recommended that the constitution of 1917 be
interpreted and applied to the nationalization of Mexican
riches. Congress accepted Calles* program and the result
was a much strong opposition from the United States gov-
ernment which at times, to 1923, threatened war between
the two nations.
The new amendment to article 27 of the constitution
of 1917 again restated the provision that iviexico, a free
countrj^, grants to l*Iexicans, mining and petroleum con-
1. Calles, Mexico Before the .Yorld
.
Page 178,
2. Dunn, iimerican Foreign Investments
.
Page 91.
t t f t
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cessions whose rights they nay transfer to persons entitled
to acquire them, and without any further limitation than
that they observe the laws in force. To foreigners are
granted the same rights providing they, too, observe Mexi-
can lav/s •
In the first place the new act regulates exploration
and exploitation of land where oil may exist, and where it
already has been found to flow freely. If an individual
desires to open up new areas where oil may be found, he
must first address the Petroleum Agency located in that
particular territory. If the Agency finds that the land
in question is "free and open" a grant is made for explor-
ation purposes for a period of one to five years. The ex-
plorer must deposit a fee with the Agency which is returned
at the expiration of the grant if all conditions of the con-
tract have been complied with. The concession may be ter-
minated by three months notice. As soon as oil is discovered
a contract to exploit the v/ell must be obtained from the
Mexican govermnent
All rights for exploitation which had begun prior to
May, 1917, or had been leased expressly to be exploited,
were to be acknowledged by the act of 1926 without any
expense whatever for those concerned. However, proper
1. The Mexican Petroleum Law
^
Pages 15 to 17.
t {
r
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claims must be filed with the Petroleum Agency, then a
concession for a fifty year period v;as to be granted,
At the end of fifty years the Ifexican government should
decide as to whether the contract Fas to be extended.
Only under certain conditions should oil be taken out of
the ground, and in no way was the oil exploiter to in-
jure the face of the land so that it could not be used
for other purposes. In addition the Mexican government
was to collect a tax on each barrel of oil extracted from
the ground. Accompanying the contract there must be a
declaration specifically acknowledging the superiority
of Mexican law over oil areas, and promising not to in-
voke the diplomatic protection of a foreign government.
Lastly, the government demanded that the new concession
be obtained previous to December 31, 1927 or else the pro-
1,
perty would be confiscated without indemnification.
Suppose an investor desired to obtain a concession
in areas which never had been exploited, but which had
been explored for oil, what would be the process and for
how long would the grant last? The concession would be
obtained from the Petroleum Agency, but the length of
the right to exploit was definitely limited to a thirty
year period. During the time of exploitation not only
should a fee be paid to the government for the concession,
but in addition a 5% tax on the gross production profits
1, The Mexican Petroleum Law . Pages 12 to 14,
0
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was to be assigned to the owner of the surface. Thus
the Mexican government gets the promoter both going and
coming, and the net result is the division of profits
among three parties,- the exploiter, the owner of the
surface, and the government (owner of the sub- soil pro-
duct s )
.
The Y/hole oblect of the Mexican government in insti
gating the concession movement, and providing for the
naturalization of all oil wells, pipe lines, refineries,
and storage tanks, was three fold. In the first place,
it retains some of the profits in Mexico v/hich formerly
had been exported to those foreign nations exploiting
Mexico; secondly, it protects the national resources;
and lastly, monopolization by a few privileged oil con-
cerns is no longer nossible. As the law is now enforced
an individual com.pany has t o make use of its concessions*
No longer is it possible to speculate to the injury of
other industrials, nor hole lands only for the sake of
preventing competition. The new act of 1926 provided
for the utilization of products of Detroleuin for the best
interests of the country. The author is inclined to be-
lieve that the object was most unselfish, and that the
Calles goverrjBent saw a chance to use som.e of the oil
profits for the building up of social and economic insti-
tutions which would be of a distinct benefit to the lower
classes of people.
f
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The legislation passed .by the Calles administra-
tion provoked much discussion in Washington. Indeed
the new interpretation revoked the cowardly "backing
down" policy which President Obregon had assumed during
the Harding administration. Calles had been :varned when
he came into office in 1925 that the United States could
give Mexico supoort "only as long as it protected American
property," and complied with its international engage-
ments and obligations. To this Calles on June 14, re-
plied that Washington's note of June 1?, 1925 threatened
the "sovereignty of Mexico.''. Continuing, he insisted
that Mexico would carefully comply with her obligations
according to international law, and would not allow any
1.
foreign nation to obtain special privileges.
The year 1926 closed, in so far as the Coolidge
Cabinet was concerned in its relationshin with Mexico,
on October 30, 1926. On that date Secretary of State
Kellogg issued what he said was his last note of the year
to Mexico. Its contents were the follov/ing,- "the United
States expects Mexico to respect in their entirety the
acquired property rights of American citizens .and
not to take any action under the laws in question and the
regulations issued in pursuance thereto, which would
operate, either directly or indirectly to deprive American
1. International Year Book, 1925, Page 723.
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citizens of the full ovmership of their social properties
1.
and property rights."
Mexico notified the American government that it, too,
was sending a last note of the year. On October 30, 1926,
Secretary of State Saenz replied,— "My government on its
part expects that your excellency vzill indicate the con-
crete cases in which recognized principles of international
law have been violated or may be violated in disregard of
legitimate interests to Araerican citizens, since in such
2,
cases it v/ill be disposed to repair such violations."
V/hether American financial interests were responsible
for the betterment of relations between Mexico and the
United States in 1927 or not, no one can ever truthfully
say. The Mexican courts were not closed to cases in which
the owners of oil wells, or mines thought that they had
been deprived of their rights. In November 1917 the Mex-
ican Supreme Court handed down a decision stating that the
constitution of 1927 as interpreted by articles 14 and 15
of the new law of 1926, had illegally confiscated those
property rights of the Mexican Petroleum Company which it
had obtained previous to I'»Iay 191'^. The result was
that on March 23, 1928 President Calles asked the Mexi-
can Supreme Court to further interpret articles 14
1. International Year Book. 19 26. Page 472.
2, Ibid . Page 472.
r. V:
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and 15 of the act of 1926 which was passed in order to
put into operation article 27 of the Mexican constitution
1.
of 1917.
Much to the relief of American and Mexican officials
and financiers the Supreme Court handed down a decision on
January 11, 1928, reversing the meaning of article 27 in
so far as it pertained to property obtained previous to
May 1, 1917. Under the new constitutional amendm.ent
those property concessions and rights granted previous to
May 1, 1917 "shall be continued without time limitation
(as against the previous 50 year limit) and shall operate
as recognition of rights acquired, which shall continue
2.
in force*. This new interpretation does in no way mean
that these properties, or grants acquired nrevious to May
1, 1917 shall not be registered with the government.
Registration must take place previous to January 12, 1929
or else property or concessions obtained before 1917 shall
be confiscated or cancelled without indemnification. The
act of 1917, as further defined in 1928, has one distinct
advantage. It eradicates that m.ore or less uncertainty
which existed previous to 1928 as to whether the Mexican
government would extend oil concessions after a fifty
year period had expired.
'1, New York Times , March 28, 1928, Page 1.
2. New York Times, January 12, 1928, Page 9.

And now that the Mexican treasury is assured
of an income from petroleum profits and taxes on all sub-
soil products extracted from the ground, what has the
Mexican peon or mestizo obtained from article 27 of the
constitution of 1917, and the profits derived therefrom?
In the first olace the Calles government has put into
effective operation that Dortion of the constitution which
states that no one individual or corporation which h^s
held title to land undisputed, for ten years shall own
more than one hundred twenty-three acres ( 50 hectares).
All in excess of this amount is to be handed over to the
commune, and the town officials are to Indemnify that
1.
person so deprived of his vested areas. This division
of lands is to be carried out by the various states, and
after its subdivision into smaller imits is to be offered
for sale to landless Mexicans at a nominal fee. All of
those who desire to take advantage of this o'"fer may be
financially aided by already established Federal Farm
Loan Banks.
Moreover, certain lands within every state are to
be used for the establishment of agricultural, vocational,
and other educational institutions. Since it is estim.ated
that 33^ to 88% of the Mexican people are illiterate, the
percentage varying according to state educational institu-
1. Mexican Constitution, Art, 27, Section 7.
e
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tions already established, Mexico has need of encourag-
ing federal and state aid for the support of schools.
Mexico with its population of 14 million, has 2,750,000
children viho should be in school, yet out of this number
1,750,000 are without educational institutions which they
1.
may attend.
The constitution of 1917 provides that education
shall be free and secular. No longer will the church
dominate the school system of Mexico, and henceforth all
private schools are to be under the direction of the
state. This drastic change is necessary if Mexicans of
the future generations are to be taught the fundamental
concepts and responsibilities of citizenship. Through
the erection of state aided agricultural schools the
Mexican farmer will be educated in the scientific methods
of farming, thus enabling him to make a more decent,
living wage.
It is the ODntention of the wealthy, who naturally
oppose this division of their lands, that the ignorant are
unappreciative of democratic institutions. Calles' re-
ply is to educate the masses, then there will be stability
in government. A program of "social action, of justice
and more humane coordination of rights and duties will
bring about in our country a greater consolidation of all
1, Saenz, Some Mexican Problems
.
Page 58.
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legitimate interests of the people." Continuing, he
states that it is not the Mexican policy to ruin property
and wealth, hut to free millions from the shackles, through
education, moral and economic stimulus and proper protec-
1.
tion under advanced laws.
On cannot be too enthusiastic over the new Mexican
program., which under the constitution of 1917, and en-
forced by such leaders as Calles and Gil, calls for the
political, economic, and social betterment of the Mexican
people through a cultural and educational system for the
benefit of the workers, with the ultimate goal a closer
cooperation between the proletariat and the government;
unity of all classes, more especially the proletariat and
the middle classes; a well planned system of communica-
tion; a well developed government devised to prevent the
control of small cliques and sectarian groups; and lastly,
foreign relations based upon eqi ity and justice, "without
admitting, that strong nations may impose their will upon
the weak, in matters of domestic concern."
It is hoped that foreign governments will abide
by the new interpretation of article 27 of the constitu-
tion of 1917, and will cooperate with the Mexican govern-
ment •
Since 1917 the Mexican government has settled two
1, Calles, Mexico Before the ';Vorld, Page 21.
9
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out of three precarious problems, namely, the question
of the ovmership of natural resources, and the agrarian
situation. There is yet to he considered the church.
It has been noted that an attempt was made by the consti-
tution of 1856 to separate the church and the state. The
obiect was to place this organization in such a Dosition
that it would no longer be a dominating political factor.
Naturally the church, with its large amounts of capital
invested in Mexico, opposed all legislation which had
for its Durpose the depriving of the church of such
rights as it had enjoyed since the sixteenth century.
It has sought to retain its privileges through the sup-
port of the aristocracy which also has been the center of
attack. The clergy then, have rendered material aid to
all Mexican leaders who have adopted a -Drogram of des-
potism and not one of reform to better the economic and
political conditions of the lower classes. Let it be
again repeated, however, that the church is not alone
in instigating the present revolution. Other vested
interests are undoubtedly hiding behind the cloak of the
church, aiding the revolutionists, yet attempting to
point to the church as the one to be blamed for the re-
bellion. All three interests, the clergy, the haclen-
dado, and the financier have joined hands, determined to
overthrov/ the constitution of 1917.
0
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Just what does this dociament say about the -'hurch?
In the first place, article 2 states that no "religious
organization or minister of any denomination m.ay establish
or direct schools of primary education." The oblect of
this section of the constitution was to give the state
absolute control of its educational system in order that
it might train the child of the future to the responsibi-
lities of government. The government has, justly or un-
justly, accused the church schools of fomenting too much
hatred toward the Federal government. The new law will
prevent such an attitude in the future. A second reason
for the state control of education has been to train the
future citizen vocationally, a factor of importance which
in the oast the church has overlooked.
Furthermore, the constitution, article 150, provides
that "in order to exercise in the United States of Mexico
the function of a minister of any form of worship, the
minister must be a Mexican citizen by birth ." Just why
did the government incorporate this clause? It m.ust be
remembered that Spanish priests outnumibered the Mexican-
born. Naturally the sympathies of the former were not
with the Mexican problem of democratic reform, but with
the church.
In 1927 there aDpeared an article in the New York
Times entitled "A Pastoral Letter of the Collective Epis-
copate of Mexico." This letter addressed to all good
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Americans, and sent from prominent church officials of
Mexico, pointed out that the present lav; prevented preach-
ing, "rendering of sacrements and worship in general,"
As a result, the letter stated, the church was unable to
administer its functions. Another complaint as embodied
in this article stated that many churches v;ere, by order
of the government, closed; To be sure these statements
were and are true even today. But let us get the other side
of the ^luestion. In reply to this i~<ew York Times article,
Calles stated "We proceed merely as v/e are obliged to do
under the law, while they, abandoning their proper sphere,
which is purely religious, seek to invade, and have in-
vaded, the spheres of the government and of politics, and
provoke disorderly movements and, overtly or covertly,
rebellion,"^*
Why are the churches closed? The constitution
guarantees freedom of religion. The reason lies in the
fact that since Spanish priests are no longer able to con-
duct services, and there are not enough Mexican-born cler-
gy, the churches had to close their doors. Furthermore,
an act of 1926 provides that all clergy shall be registered
before Ivlarch 1, 1929. iigain since many priests have re-
fused to obey the orders of the government, churches have
1, Calles: Mexico Before the World
.
Pages 116 to 125.
2. Ibid, Page 117.
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not been reopened. There Is no logical reason why the
clergy should not register, except there is a fear on
their part that if they cio this, it will be a virtual
recognition of the superior authority of the state.
Once recognition without protest is given, then their
property, except that needed for church purposes, will
be confiscated. Secondly, there is a widespread belief
that Protestantism will become much stronger once their
power is surrendered. Little does the church realise,
apparently, that land in Mexico is not for the enrich-
ment of the church, but the public*
In a recent memorial of the Catholic Church to
President Calles, the church complained of the fact that
his government was violating one of the **rights of man"
by not allowing it to have freedom of the press. To be
sure, Calles replied, the constitution does grant that
privilege, but article 130 definitely states that no
church organ shall "repudiate the actions of the govern-
ment, or criticise it in any way, or encourage disobedi-
ence to its lawso** Naturally the church will object to
any clause which tends to prevent its spreading anti-
democratic propaganda among its devotees o"^
*
That the church has its grievances there is no doubt.
The government has undoubtedly been very drastic in
1. Calles; Mexico 3efore the V/orld y Pege 199.
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carrying out the provlsicns of article 150 of the consti-
tution, of 1917. But has not the cliurch itself done every-
thing it could since 1356 to repudiate the more or less
lenient lav/s directed against it? There has been no co-
operation between church and state, and the latter has
been compelled to use force to strengthen its demands. The
method which Mexico is now using is no different from the
action taken by France in 1905, or thr.t by England during
the 17th century.
The future of Mexico, then, lies in iT;s ability to
enforce its laws as enacted in 1917, and interpreted in
1926, It is not the cooperation of the Mexicans alone
that is needed, but that of foreign governments and finan-
ciers and the church. He who has studied the Mexican sit-
uation cannot but feel enthusiastic over the new outlook
in Mexico. Upon the guidance of such leaders as those
who are looking, not for personal gain, but toivard advanc-
ing the welfare of the Mexican public, does the future of
Mexico depend.
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It has been the purpose of the author in the fore-
going dissertation to emphasize three periods of ^erican
military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico, and to
come to some conclusion as to whether the United States,
in each case noted, was justified in pursuing the policy-
it did. In the first period of intervention, the Texan
V7ar of 1346 to 1343, ths United States legally interfered
in Mexican politics. Relations between i-Iexico and Texas
had become so unbearable that the separation of the two
territories was inevitable. Shortly after Texas had severed
its relationship with Mexico, and had declared its independ-
ence, its citizens, dissatisfied vrith domestic conditions,
invited the United States to annex Texas, The annexation of
this southern territory was naturally a signal for war be-
tween the United States and Mexico. The Mexican government
naturally had thought that it a sovereign rights had been
encroached upon. But it must be remembered that the citi-
zens of a nation, through self-determination, have the final
say as to the jurisdiction under which they desire to be.
The United States, for its part, did all that it
I f
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possibly could to avert this var . Military intervention
was forced upon us, and territorial expansion legalized
through a treaty of neace with Mexico in 1848.
The second phase of American intervention in the
affairs of Mexico was, in decided contrast to the first, pure
ly diplomatic in nature. In 1864 Napoleon III, at the invi-
tation of the aristocratic and clerical elements in Mexico,
and for his own selfish desires of expansion, established
Maximilian upon the throne of Mexico. In 1865 Secretary
of State Seward strenuously ob.lected to this tyne of conquest
and warned NaDoleon that the United States would no longer
tolerate the continuation of the French monarchy in Mexico.
By 1867 the last of the French troops had been withdrawn.
Napoleon III had not only ceased to support Maximilian be-
cause of the need of his troops and money in an approaching
war with Germany, but he feared the Monroe Doctrine, which
had definitely warned Europe, in 1825, that the United States
would view with alarm the creation of monarchical forms of
government in this hemisphere.
The last period of American diplomatic and military
intervention in Mexico extends from 1878 to the present time.
It must be noted that military intervention in this last
period merely resulted in whnt some American statesmen wish
to call "punitive expeditions." The Tampico incident, how-
ever, is as clear an evidence of forceful intervention as the
I
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qjilitary history of the world can cite. Under the pretext
of insufficient redress of grievances the American govern-
ment sought to oust Huerta who was unfriendly to United States
financiers
.
It is probably best to phrase this last period as the
financial exploitation of Mexico, backed as it were, by
Washington, American financiers, upon the invitation of
Diaz in 1878, made heavy investments in that Latin-American
nation, and taking advantage of the government's need of
money exploited Mexican riches accordingly. Whenever domes-
tic conditions were not ccndiucive toward the peaceful pene-
tration of Mexico's natural resources, whenever American in-
terests were threatened by confiscation or destruction, the
aid of our government was immediately invoked. As a result
the diplom.acy betv/een Mexico and the United States has been
based upon threats which at times have nearly brought about
war. In rendering protection to our interests we have not
gone outside of the established precedents of international
law. It always has been the policy of a larger nation to
intervene in the affairs of that smaller nation w''- ich is
unable to give sufficient police protection to foreign
property. It is merely a question as to whether the United
States has been and will be justified in the future in re-
fusing to recognize or render material support to a Mexican
leader who will not be friendly to American interests. Will
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it ever be a future policy of the Washington government
to create a precedent by refusing to aid American investors
abroad who, in exploiting the riches of a weaker nation,
have done so knowing that the unstability of politics renders
safe investment impossible? If money is invested in this
country at the owner's risk and without the protection of
the United States army, why should foreign investments carry
with them a gun full of shot?
There can be no question that the influence of the
State Department brought about a revision of Article 27 as
incorporated in the constitution of 1917, and as further
interpreted in 1925. The Mexican government, however, had
overstepped its rights in withdrawing leases, grants and
concessions given in perpetuity by the successive legisla-
tive acts of 1884, 1892, and 1906. She has been justified,
however, in confiscating, with or without indemnification,
those lands purchased or leased since 1917. In accordance
with American constitutional interpretation Mexico actually
has a right to regulate the exploitation of natural re-
sources in whatever manner she may deem expedient.
Having obtained one step in the revision of the
constitution of 1917, what will be the future policy?
Undoubtedly the new administration will take a friendly and
cooperative attitude tov/ard the rehabilitation of Mexico.
President
It has already been/Hoover's program to support President
Gil as against those rebel leaders who, for one reason or
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another, have attempted to gain control of Mexico City for
the attainment of selfish glory. Although some radicals
may criticise the administration for materially aiding the
Gil faction, nevertheless, if it comes down to the question
of democracy or anarchy, the former should be upheld at the
expense of the latter.
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